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Since its statutory creation in 1997, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) has virtually 
unanimously been seen as a shining light of South African public administration due to its widely 
perceived efficiency and record of consistently and comfortably surpassing revenue collection 
targets. Although SARS’ successes have been well documented, little to no research has 
occurred on the genesis of this institution. In addition, while the field of tax administration is replete 
with literature from development economists in particular, there does not appear to be much 
attempt in the archive to study tax administration or tax administration reform from a public 
administration perspective. This dissertation attempts to do precisely that. 
It seeks to answer the following linked research questions. Firstly, which forces led to the 
establishment of SARS? Secondly, with respect to the structural idiosyncrasies which define 
SARS, which of these elements most significantly distinguish SARS from the rest of the South 
African public administration and other semi-autonomous revenue authorities and what led to 
these structural idiosyncrasies? The dissertation does this through a document analysis of various 
primary and secondary literature such as government publications, statutes, parliamentary 
publications, commission reports and academic literature.  
The dissertation perceives the tax administration reform process leading to the creation of SARS 
through the lens of the sub-field of public administration known as public management reform. In 
this vein the dissertation applies the Pollitt-Bouckaert model of public management reform as a 
framework and heuristic device through which the dissertation’s analysis is carried out. 
These findings are that SARS is most distinguished by its removal from the public service and 
comparatively high provision for mechanisms of executive control. It further finds that SARS’s 
aforementioned distinctive features arose from fiscal exigencies, a lack of policy contestation and 
economic paradigm shifts among key groups of elites. The comparatively high emphasis for 
executive control is found to be as a result of public service reform priorities in the first post-
apartheid government.  
Key concepts 
Tax administration reform; semi-autonomous revenue authority model; South African Revenue 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Until the 1990s, tax administration was a field which had had a relatively low amount of research 
attention given to it. This however began to change with the emergence, largely due to the 
influence of international financial and aid organisations, of the semi-autonomous revenue 
authority (SARA) model as part of a wave of reconfigurations of public administrations that swept 
the globe during this period. The main distinguishing feature of a SARA was its autonomy, being 
its independence from the rest of the public service. Autonomy was argued to be a necessary 
ingredient for gains in revenue collection efficiency and effectiveness. Since the proliferation of 
the SARA model, there has been a steady stream of research, still dominated by international 
financial and aid organisations, into various aspects of the model, including its effectiveness in 
achieving sustainable revenue collection gains in the global south. Although increasingly 
circumspect about its effectiveness, the research has still placed a high value on the 
autonomisation of revenue collection.  
The majority of the above research has come from researchers in the development and 
economics communities. The application of knowledge from public administration is a glaring 
omission from the research archive on the SARA model. Also missing from the archive are in-
depth studies of the domestic political-economic forces which have led to particular countries 
adopting this model, as well as those which have shaped the minutiae that distinguish one SARA 
from another. Despite the fact that SARAs are prevalent the world over, the form which they take 
varies considerably and studies of the factors which have shaped these differences – and which 
are important as they may also assist in accounting for variances in effectiveness of the model 
between countries – are few if not entirely missing. These questions: of what drives a process of 
reform and how these drivers shape the end-product of that reform process are questions which 
are at the heart of the sub-field of public administration that is public management reform (or 
public sector reform).  
It will be in an attempt to contribute to this aspect of the literature that this dissertation will apply 
a slightly modified seminal model of public management reform developed by Pollitt and 
Bouckaert1 to the South African tax administration reform process which took the country from an 
                                               
1 Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis - New 






intra-departmental revenue collection service to a SARA, the South African Revenue Service 
(SARS). This dissertation will seek to answer the following two questions: 
1. Which political-economic forces led to the establishment of SARS? And; 
2. With respect to the structural idiosyncrasies which define SARS: 
a. Which of these elements most significantly distinguish SARS from the rest of the 
South African civil service and from other SARAs? and; 
b. In what way were these elements shaped by the forces in 1? 
This chapter begins by discussing the research methodology adopted in this dissertation and 
proceeds to introduce the SARA model in detail. In doing so, the chapter unravels the history of 
the model, its purported advantages, its most distinctive features as well as those aspects of its 
structure and effectiveness which are most hotly contested in the literature. The Chapter 
continues by presenting and then critically analysing the Pollitt-Bouckaert model of public 
management reform which frames the discussion in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 then follows as a 
response to question 2.a. in that it examines the reforms and provides illumination on SARS’ most 
distinctive features. From this basis, Chapters 3 and 4 then address questions 1 and 2.b. 
1.1 Research design and methodology  
This dissertation takes as its point of reference the idea that tax administration reform in South 
Africa occurred as an instance of public sector reform. On this premise, the Pollitt-Bouckaert 
Model of Public Management Reform has been chosen as an appropriate lens through which to 
conduct the ensuing analysis. The model is used in this dissertation not as an explanatory 
mechanism but as a framework and heuristic device through which a thorough mapping of the 
political-economic forces for reform will occur. The dissertation hopes to continue a tradition 
begun by Karalaeva2 of applying the Pollitt-Bouckaert Model to tax policy and in contexts other 
than Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Unlike 
Karalaeva, this dissertation centres only on tax administration and not on tax policy in its entirety. 
The findings themselves have been made using a database sourced principally through desktop 
analyses of publicly available primary and secondary literature such as reports, parliamentary 
debates, departmental publications, political party publications, academic research and public 
                                               
2 Elima Karalaeva, "Applying a Model of Public Management Reform to Tax Reform in a Post-Soviet 





speeches. This research is therefore most succinctly described as explanatory qualitative 
research. 
1.2 The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority 
The term “semi-autonomous revenue authority” refers to a governance regime featuring “a 
dedicated separate organisation for revenue administration … separate from formal internal 
structures of the MOF [Ministry of Finance] (or its equivalent) and with a broad range of 
autonomous powers”3. It is “semi-“ autonomous because unlike institutions such as most central 
banks, it is still accountable to the executive.  
While there are variations between countries on the specificities of their structural design, SARAs 
tend to share the following typifying elements4: 
1. Special legal authority 
SARAs possess a distinctive legal dispensation which affords them unique powers and privileges 
under the law. In most cases this includes being outside of the public service and possessing the 
legal authority to enter into contracts and own property. Thus, they are usually not subject to 
public sector employment or procurement regulations.   
2. Integrated tax administration 
They are solely tasked with administering and enforcing all of a country’s revenue laws, thus 
unifying administration of customs, income tax, VAT, corporate taxes and other state revenues 
such as, in South Africa’s case, unemployment insurance. The head of the SARA is fully vested 
with all relevant collection and administration powers in those laws.  
3. Alternative governance arrangements 
SARAs tend to utilise private sector-inspired governance tools such as boards and performance 
agreements. 
                                               
3 William Crandall, Revenue Administration: Autonomy in Tax Administration and the Revenue Authority 
Model (Washington: Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, 2010). 8.  
4 Robert Taliercio, Designing performance: The semi-autonomous revenue authority model in Africa and 
Latin America. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (Washington: World, 2004); Crandall, 
Revenue Administration, 7; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Moore, Mick, "Revenue Authorities and Public 






1.2.1 Origins and claims of the model 
The SARA model has its origins in the Executive Agencies thematic of the style of reforms in 
many developed countries in the 1980s and best exemplified by The UK’s “Next Steps” 
programme5. Although having its origins in West Europe and North America, the model has 
gained its highest popularity in the global south where since Ghana (1985) and Bolivia (1987) 
were SARA pioneers in the 1980s, the model has been adopted by numerous other countries6. 
In Ghana in 1985, the SARA model was essentially adopted as an emergency measure to 
resuscitate what had by then become an extremely dire fiscal situation. Since then the model has 
become the vanguard of tax administration best practice in developing countries and has been 
applied by countries with much healthier fiscal positions. In the 1990s Zambia (1994), Kenya 
(1995), Tanzania (1996), Rwanda (1998) and the subject of this dissertation, South Africa (1997), 
all adopted the SARA model despite the fact that the fiscal outlooks of most of these countries 
were much better than the model’s initial African applicants7. 
Many OECD countries have also decided to utilise the model. The OECD found that in 2008, 
more than half (17 out of 30) OECD member countries had what it termed a “unified semi-
autonomous body” including the United States, Australia, Canada, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan8. As of 2010, there were almost 40 SARAs in the world, most of which are located in 
Latin America and Africa9. 
As with any type of executive agency, justifications of the SARA model lie mainly in the realm of 
economic efficiency and effectiveness. By focusing solely on revenue administration a SARA is 
said to achieve efficiencies of specialisation, thus decreasing the marginal cost of tax collection10. 
The efficiencies arise through the integration of the administration of all taxes, thus permitting a 
                                               
5 Nick Devas, Simon Delay and Michael Hubbard, "Revenue authorities: are they the right vehicle for 
improved tax administration?" Public Administration and Development 21, no. 3 (2001): 211-222; 
Taliercio, Designing Performance, 2. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, 213. 
8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Tax Administration in OECD and 
Selected Non-OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2008). (Paris: OECD Forum on Tax 
Administration, 2009). 26. 
9 Crandall, Revenue Administration, 7. 





functional internal structure as opposed to one based on type of tax. These efficiencies arise in 
areas such as taxpayer identification and records, IT, legal services and accounting and 
auditing11. While tax reform and tax administration reform can in general be undertaken with the 
aim of achieving procedural and economic equity –such as by equalising compliance costs or tax 
burdens across gender, income, race stratifications, etc. – the literature in favour of the SARA 
model does not reveal many equity-based articulations of its primacy. Taliercio is one of the few 
writers who contends that autonomisation is the mechanism through which “fair tax 
administration” can be achieved12. 
It is also maintained that a SARA’s positioning outside the public service frees it from political 
interference, thus allowing it to concentrate entirely on efficient revenue collection13. This freedom 
from political influence is a benefit that has been particularly emphasised in applying the SARA 
model to countries in the global south, especially in Africa and Latin America where 
autonomisation is perceived as necessary for putting tax administration beyond the reach of 
political patronage networks14.  
Moreover, control over tax collection agencies carries high political appeal. This is because tax 
collection agencies bear incomparably intrusive and pervasive powers as a result of their relatively 
unbridled access to the financial information of almost all individuals and businesses in society 
combined with their ability to institute criminal action15.  
Taliercio puts it thusly regarding autonomy and its use as a tool to escape political influence: 
“Autonomy is also considered an antidote to the failure of the political system to build in 
effective accountability mechanisms that channel political influence around and through 
the public administration in appropriate, salutary ways. When the political system fails to 
do these things, undue political influence, which distorts and undermines public service 
provision, is exerted over public administration. Autonomy is then the vehicle by which the 
                                               
11 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, “Revenue Authorities”, 215. 
12 Taliercio, Designing Performance, 5. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
14 Ibid. 





intended outcome— competent, effective, and fair tax administration—is supposed to be 
attained”16 
A third argument often used in favour of the SARA model is that the supposedly unique nature of 
revenue administration, which requires skilled staff such as tax lawyers, forensic auditors and 
chartered accountants, demands that tax administration be independent from public service 
employment and expenditure regulations, which are often characterised as “sclerotic” and 
“inadequate”17. This is to allow them the opportunity to maintain an appropriately skilled and 
incentivised staff complement by providing remuneration which is commensurate with what these 
individuals would earn in the private sector and by providing more flexibility in recruitment and 
dismissal”18. It is claimed that these allowances are specifically necessary for tax administration 
over any other area of the public administration because “though the problems of a weak civil 
service affect the whole of government…those problems are felt much more acutely in the tax 
administration as compared to most other public agencies”19. 
1.2.2 Funding 
SARAs are typically funded in one of three ways, each of which has, as the contested nature of 
the literature on funding mechanisms would suggest, its own attractions and shortcomings: 1) 
Entirely through an annual parliamentary appropriation; 2) Percentage of revenue collections or; 
3) Annual appropriations combined with a percentage of revenue collections above target. 
Those in favour of an entirely percentage-based funding mechanism usually cite several reasons 
for doing so. They argue that because many of the countries in which these reforms are 
implemented often demonstrate very fragile and unstable public finance management systems, 
these countries are likely to feature significant variations and uncertainties in funding government 
entities. Therefore, reliance on parliamentary appropriations – which are inevitably made through 
extractions from the national revenue fund and are thus at the mercy of the public finance system 
– create strong obstacles to effective tax administration. Exponents of the percentage-based 
system further assert that percentage-based systems are superior because they create internal 
                                               
16 Ibid., 5. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Crandall, Revenue Administration, 6; Taliercio, Designing Performance, 5; Devas, Delay and Hubbard, 
“Revenue Authorities”, 214. 





incentives to the SARAs to increase collections or risk losing budget. This relies on the classical 
(and debatable) assumption of bureaucrats as budget maximisers20.   
The percentage-based approach does have some major shortcomings. One of these is the fact 
that it places the SARA’s budget at the mercy of forces which it cannot control. Revenue 
collections are not merely a function of the performance of the SARA, they are also influenced by 
changes in tax policy as well as national and global economic performance, all of which the 
Commissioner and his staff do not control. As a result, it is argued, effective, efficient tax 
administration can be compromised by economic volatilities, thus potentially jeopardising tax 
administration at precisely the point in the business cycle it is most required in order to ensure 
fiscal stability. 
There is also a risk that an entirely performance-based funding system – especially one that is 
paired with individual bonuses if targets are met – will lead to an over-zealous tax authority, one 
willing to sacrifice procedural and administrative equity in favour of higher revenue collections. 
This aggressiveness can manifest itself in the revenue authority paying more attention to easy to 
tax sectors, increasing its number of audits of individuals and being inordinately quick to litigate. 
This can happen at the expense of addressing important but not revenue-rewarding concerns 
such as recovering long-standing arrears, expediting trade and enforcing customs prohibitions at 
border posts21. 
1.2.3 In opposition to the SARA model 
There are several main arguments raised against the SARA model. The first one is based on the 
reform strategy it inherently advocates, being what has been referred to as an “enclave” 
approach22. Some argue that a singular focus on tax administration does not adequately address 
the need for comprehensive public sector reform. While there may certainly be benefits from 
addressing issues in tax administration, there is a strong argument to be made that an enclave 
approach distracts from the energetic solution of problems that are pervasive to the entire public 
service. For instance, Crandall and Kidd found that solutions to human resources problems other 
                                               
20 Ibid., 8. 
21 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, “Revenue Authorities”, 218. 
22 Taliercio, Designing Performance; Arthur Mann. "Are Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities the 
Answer to Tax Administration Problems in Developing Countries? A Practical Guide" Research paper for 






than HR autonomy were not adequately considered by elites before deciding to adopt the SARA 
model, including the option to reform HR for the civil service as a whole23.  Additionally the 
adoption of the SARA model could possibly leave issues of the underlying tax system or tax 
administration unaddressed if autonomisation is believed by national elites to be a panacea for 
all revenue collection woes24. 
Another argument against the establishment of a SARA model is that doing so can be an 
expensive exercise, during both the process of reform itself but also in terms of additional 
permanent costs. With the flexibility to determine its own pay scales and the operational and 
budgetary flexibility to spend more on office and technological equipment, a SARA is likely to 
spend more per unit of revenue collected than its intra-departmental predecessor. This is 
particularly true for cases in which the SARA’s funding is percentage-based. These costs may be 
offset by additional gains in revenue and they may in fact be justified in the context of extracting 
substantially more revenue than the status quo. The costs may also be justified if there had been 
under-spending (in comparative terms) on revenue collection until the introduction of the SARA. 
Devas et al raise Zambia’s Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) as an example of the phenomenon 
of higher revenue collection costs: whereas revenue collection costs had been legislatively limited 
to 3% of revenue collections and ambitiously targeted at 1.9%, actual costs were 4% of revenue 
collected after the introduction of the ZRA25. 
There is a possibility that the agentification of the public service through the introduction of a 
SARA will result in fragmentation of the civil service and therefore produce “negative externalities” 
on the rest of government in light of the exceptional treatment of the SARA and its staff. It is 
argued that the better staff remuneration in the SARA might result in other civil servants becoming 
envious and resentful of SARA staff, thus jeopardising prospects for effective inter-agency 
cooperation. Moreover, higher remuneration in the revenue authority could result in pressures for 
higher remuneration across the public administration. This was the case in Uganda where 
revenue authority remuneration levels were eventually frozen until the remuneration gap with the 
rest of the public administration was deemed sufficiently small26.  
                                               
23 William Crandall and Maureen Kidd, Revenue Authorities: Issues and Problems in Evaluating Their 
Success. No. 6-240. (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2006).  52. 
24 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, “Revenue Authorities”, 216.  
25 Ibid. 





Given that a revenue authority is a crucial and hugely powerful cog in the state machinery (‘a 
super entity”27 of sorts), it is crucial that there be political accountability over its actions. Creating 
a SARA does however risk producing accountability links that are too tenuous to adequately 
restrain and modulate the exceptional power that comes with administrating revenue laws, thus 
potentially resulting in unapproved and corrupt actions by the SARA or the concentration of undue 
political influence in the hands of the principal of the SARA. The emergence of corruption in the 
Uganda Revenue Authority in the late 1990s serves as an example of how there is potential for 
abuse of the privileges afforded by autonomy28.  
Another often raised argument against the SARA model is that it may essentially amount to an 
overly radical cure to problems which can be solved through less disruptive means. In cases 
where the national fiscal position is on the brink and the pre-existing public service remuneration 
levels come nowhere close to providing attractive pay for skilled individuals – as was the case in 
Ghana in 1985 – the SARA option might be the correct solution. On the other hand, in much less 
severe situations, utilisation of the SARA model may be a rather overhanded response29.  
Furthermore, even if the necessary reforms extend beyond personnel and include modernisation 
of tax administration methods, there is no evidence to suggest that this cannot take place in the 
absence of a SARA. Indeed, some countries have seen the SARA reforms as a much needed 
catalyst for modernisation but others, as one respondent to the Crandall and Kidd study put it, 
“could have done most of these initiatives without RA status anyway” 30. 
In fact, one of the major alternatives to the SARA model is what is referred to as the “gradualist 
approach” which as the name suggests involves the gradual introduction of modest reforms over 
a period of time in order to achieve improvements in revenue collection. Chile is cited as a prime 
example of a country for which this approach has worked well, leading to its tax administration 
department being “among the best in the developing world” even though its tax administration is 
not autonomous31.   That being said, Taliercio cautions against overstating the merits of this 
approach in light of the fact that Chile’s tax administration reforms were implemented over a period 
                                               
27 Mann, “Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities”, 2. 
28 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, “Revenue Authorities”, 217.  
29 Ibid., 216. 
30 Crandall and Kidd, Issues and Problems, 51. 





of over thirty years and took place in the context of an already professionally-oriented civil service. 
His contention is that the slowness of this approach must be taken into account when contrasting 
it to other reform approaches whose rapidity could make them the superior option32. 
1.2.4 Effectiveness  
Research into the effectiveness of the SARA model is fraught with methodological difficulties. The 
difficulties lie mainly in being able to attribute revenue collection increases to specific tax 
administration reforms such as the introduction of a SARA where revenue collections are a 
function of a large number of variables such as macroeconomic performance, taxpayer morality, 
tax policy changes, and tax rate changes. It is therefore unsurprising that there are not many 
researchers who have given themselves the ambitious task of empirically testing whether the 
introduction of the SARA model – or even more daringly, whether specific features of the SARA 
model such as autonomy and certain governance frameworks – have had a positive impact on 
revenue collections. Nevertheless, the research that has been performed has produced rather 
mixed results. Although the revenue administrators themselves overwhelmingly perceive SARA 
reforms to have been beneficial to performance33, there is little evidence to support this. While 
there was success in boosting revenue collection during the early years of SARA adoption 
amongst countries in the global south in the 1990s (Ghana for example saw tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP grow from 4.6% in 1983 to 17% in 1994 even though tax rates had 
decreased34), such successes have not always been durable35.  For these reasons, Fjeldstad and 
Moore state that “[t]o date, there is little sign that the creation of revenue agencies has actually 
increased public revenues”36. 
This is the same conclusion reached by Mann37 in a 2004 USAID-funded in-depth study of SARAs 
in five locations: Peru, Tanzania, Guatemala, Ecuador and Lima (a rare case of a sub-national 
SARA). Mann uses his own experiences in consulting on SARAs during his time at the World 
Bank and combines it with an analysis of available case studies to conclude that while the SARA 
                                               
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 Crandall and Kidd, Issues and Problems. 
34 Devas, Delay and Hubbard, “Revenue Authorities”, 213. 
35 Taliercio, Designing Performance, 2.  
36 Fjeldstad and Moore, “Revenue Authorities and Public Authority”, 1. 





model can be a useful medium through which to implement other wholesale changes to tax 
administration, it does not serve as a panacea for all revenue collection ills. He finds that while 
there may or may not be short term improvements in revenue collection ratios, the implementation 
of a SARA in and of itself does not augur long-term improvements in revenue administration. 
Other factors, such as the degree of autonomy given to the SARA (modulated by the appropriate 
degree of accountability and anti-corruption mechanisms), the strength of relationships between 
the SARA and other institutions in the public service like the departments of finance and justice, 
play a more influential role in revenue administration success.  Fundamentally, his research finds 
that it is the clichéd factors such as quality of leadership and political will which ultimately 
determine whether there will be sustainable improvements in revenue collection.  
Crandall and Kidd’s38 2006 International Monetary Fund (IMF) study is another attempt at 
assessing the effectiveness of the SARA model. Like Mann, the researchers combined an 
analysis of pre-existing research with their own experiences in providing technical assistance to 
countries with and without SARAs, in formulating conclusions. Unlike Mann however, they also 
requested SARA officials to complete questionnaires which included a self-analysis of whether 
the implementation of the SARA model had improved performance. They too found that there was 
no evidence to suggest that the implementation of the SARA model had achieved improvements 
in performance which outstripped the performance that would have been achieved had tax 
administration remained within a government department.  
While Taliercio’s39 2004 World Bank study also found mixed results in SARA performance as a 
whole, he concluded that there was a positive relationship between autonomy and revenue 
authority performance amongst the six African and Latin American SARAs he studied. From 
interviews with development officials and staff at the various SARAs, and tax collection data in 
Kenya, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Uganda and Venezuela, Taliercio concludes that autonomy, 
and stability of autonomy (whether high or low), are beneficial to performance. Although he notes 
that overall performance amongst these countries is mixed, he attributes these poorer 
performances to a number of elements, including lower autonomy and stability in autonomy, 
particularly in the cases of Mexico and Uganda. As such, recommendations from this study 
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include that SARAs be given absolute operational autonomy and that they be distanced from the 
MOF if the position is “highly politicised”40.  
1.3 The Pollitt-Bouckaert Model of Public Management Reform 
Depicted in Figure 1.1 below, the Pollitt-Bouckaert model of public management reform is one of 
the most recent and arguably most seminal attempts to account for the increasingly ubiquitous 
phenomenon of public management reform.  
The model acts as a mapping of the political-economic and social forces which result in public 
management reform and is built on the authors’ decades’ worth of experience in scholarship on 
comparative government. As they put it, the model “represents an inductive synthesis of what we 
have learnt about the process of reform in many countries”41.  Its creators intend it as a 
“conceptual map”42 more than as a coherent theoretical model with inbuilt causation and effect 
algorithms. In short, it is a “diagram of forces, and a heuristic device”43. 
The central thesis of the model is that public management reforms emerge from public sector 
elites in a top-down manner and are the culmination of interactions between socio-economic 
forces and the existing political-administrative system in the country.  
It must also be noted that the model is more descriptive than it is normative. Instead of depicting 
the forces which should affect public management reform and proposing who should make reform 
decisions, the model is the authors’ “inductive synthesis” of the forces which do affect public 
management and the actors which do make reform decisions. This means that, for instance, when 
critiquing the degree of elite centrality in the model, one must criticise the authors’ inductions and 
not the desirability of elite decision-making. 
As Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, the emergence of a SARA in South Africa came about as 
a result of the interplay between various actors and forces, with a complex array of interlinking 
relationships and effects. It is because of this model’s ability to act as a means through which to 
navigate these complexities, that it becomes especially useful in this dissertation.  
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As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, the model incorporates a number of various national and 
international agents and forces, both human and institutional. The essence of the model is that 
public management reforms emerge out of the interactions of these various actors and forces.  
1.3.1 Key assumptions 
The Pollitt-Bouckaert model rests on a number of assumptions. Some of the most crucial 
assumptions, particularly in relation to the topic at hand, are the following.  
i. National agency: Public management reforms are enacted intentionally by the 
government of the country. 
Figure 1.1. The Pollitt-Bouckaert Model of Public Management Reform 
Source: Pollitt, C & Bouckaert, G. 2011. Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo Weberian State. New York: 





ii. Elite centrality: Public management reforms are initiated in a top-down fashion by political 
and civil service elites.  These elites: 
a. Have “a measure of choice as to the specific instruments and techniques which 
are chosen”44. 
b. Are constrained by what is feasible, economically and politically. 
iii. Piecemeal reform: Public management reforms are usually not comprehensive45. 
1.3.2 The forces 
1.3.2.1 A: Socio-economic forces 
Rather than being the primary drivers of change or inertia, the model conceives of socio-economic 
forces as being primarily background in nature, with a few exceptions noted below. Thus, by and 
large, socio-economic forces act as “deep-rooted and “long-lasting”46 structural foundations for 
public management reform. 
1.3.2.1.1 B: Global Economic Forces 
The inclusion of global economic forces into the model stems from a widely articulated 
observation that many public sector reforms around the world, for example those which occurred 
in the United Kingdom and New Zealand in the 1980s and early 1990s, were demonstrably 
influenced by pressures of economic recession47. Global pressures of this sort have also been 
particularly acute in the developing world where due to the need to seek and maintain foreign 
direct investment coupled with the pressures of assuaging international financial organisations on 
whom many countries rely for aid, there has been a resultant aversion to high public spending48. 
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As a result the prominence of reforms which seek to “lighten the bureaucratic burden” has risen. 
These reforms have included rightsizing, privatisation, and outsourcing. 
Despite the fact that global economic forces have largely been background forces, their role has 
been limited to compelling change and not directing the “precise timing or degree” of reform. This 
is an important part of the model, as it means that when students of public sector reform perform 
an analysis of any reform, they must undertake an examination of the state of the global economy 
not with the intention of extracting public management solutions, but with the intention of 
perceiving global economic forces as background forces to reform. Pollitt and Bouckaert write: 
“it should be noted that economic pressures do not themselves translate directly into some 
particular type of management reform. Reformers need ideas - models or patterns or plans 
or visions of how the public sector could be better organised. Markets may provide the 
pressure to do something but they do not supply the ideas of exactly what to do.” 49 
They further add: 
“economic forms of globalisation do seem to have been a major influence on institutional 
change, but one which acted through a number of other, intervening variables. These other 
variables have been crucial in determining the precise shape and timing of the reforms in 
particular countries.” 50 
1.3.2.1.2 C: Socio-demographic change 
Socio-demographic changes are changes “in the pattern of life” of a large number of a country’s 
citizens in a way that mandates state response51. Examples of these include increased life 
expectancy, more single-parent or single member households and changes in the level of 
unemployment. Other examples of potentially relevant socio-demographic changes include a 
larger number of child headed homes due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, an increase in teenage 
pregnancies and outbreaks of communicable infections such as Ebola. A defining socio-
demographic change in the period under study is the acquisition by black South Africans of 
political rights to which they had previously been denied and therefore an increase in the number 
of unemployed and poor individuals having rights to state assistance. The common thread running 
                                               







through all of these socio-demographic changes is the fact that they compel state action and thus 
necessitate reconsiderations of the nature of existing state instruments used to deal with the 
problems.  
Like the effect of global economic forces, socio-demographic changes do not introduce specific 
kinds of organisational change. Instead, they act as incentives for change52. 
Together, global economic forces and socio-demographic changes, induce box D, “Socio-
economic policies”, being the statements of government intent with regard to how government 
intends to react to challenges posed by socio-demographic changes and any pressures or 
opportunities presented by the global economic system. These socio-economic policies then 
influence elite-decision making by shaping the desirability and feasibility of specific public 
management reforms.  
1.3.2.2 E: Political System 
These are the features of the macro-political system which permit or restrain change. They are 
primarily based on the country’s constitution – if it adopts one – and its provisions on making 
amendments to public sector structures and to the constitution itself. Pollitt and Bouckaert contrast 
Germany and the UK in this respect. Whereas in the UK “changing the machinery of government” 
involves merely passing secondary legislation through the legislature, Germany’s constitution 
“makes it difficult, if not impossible for major restructuring to take place at the federal level” and 
affords sub-national governments constitutional protection from federally-imposed change 
through a high degree of political decentralisation53. 
1.3.2.2.1 F: New Management Ideas 
Pollitt and Bouckaert contend that new management ideas permeate into elites’ perceptions of 
what the desirable reforms are through the influence of international bodies (the OECD’s public 
management agency (PUMA) being prominent in the countries examined in detail in their book), 
management ideas borrowed from the private sector through business schools, books on 
management written by business “gurus” and the presentations and reports by management 
consultants54. 
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1.3.2.2.2 G: Pressures from citizens 
While rarely being the leading force for specific public sector reforms, pressures from citizens can 
be significant background forces in both causing change and directing the nature and timing of 
the change. Pressure from citizens for change could be felt by political representatives if for 
instance, as was observed as a background force for critiques of Weberian forms of public 
administration, citizens come to become used to the responsive and attentive service they receive 
from private sector organisations and then “become progressively more and more discontented” 
with the service they obtain from government entities55.  
1.3.2.2.3 H: Party political ideas  
These are primarily internally generated ideas about how particular political parties “would like to 
govern”56. They are largely rooted in the defining ideological positions of the parties and are thus 
usually part of a specific political agenda being driven by the party. They can also be responses 
to popular ideas from citizens and the influence of the actors mentioned in F, hence the model 
depicts direct connections between new management ideas, pressures from citizens and party 
political ideas. 
1.3.2.3 I: Chance events 
This element of the model accounts for the influence of unpredictable and often newsworthy 
events such as “scandals, natural or man-made disasters, accidents, and unpredictable tragedies 
such as shootings or epidemics” on precipitating reform57. Examples mentioned by the authors 
include the Cave Creek disaster in New Zealand which focused attention on public accountability 
in decentralised administration and the space shuttle “Challenger” disaster which resulted in 
reforms of the USA’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  
As a summary of the most influential of the forces described above, Pollitt and Bouckaert write: 
“Taking a broad view, therefore, the upsurge of reforms in the last twenty years or so can be 
attributed to an intensification of a number of factors, but perhaps particularly global economic 
forces, socio-economic change, and the supply of new management ideas (B, C, and F)”58. 
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1.3.2.4 K: Administrative system 
The administrative system is the distinctive state and governmental structure of a particular 
country. The administrative system dictates the cost of change as it informs the extent to which 
path dependency creates “heavy disincentives for change”59. Examples of such country-specific 
idiosyncrasies include the centralised nature of French government, the generalist academic 
backgrounds of senior public servants in the UK and the federalised state of government in 
Germany and many of the Nordic countries. Pre-existing internal rules of operation also form part 
of the administrative system. These are not matters which can be altered overnight and will 
undoubtedly frame the way “officials conceptualise and approach a wide variety of issues” 
including the desirability of certain reforms60. 
In the same way that the political system described in E can be a restraining force on change, so 
to can the prevailing administrative system. Pollitt and Bouckaert thus write that “the two act jointly 
to temper the ardour of the reformers with the sober difficulties of shifting the status quo. Thus we 
depict them as enclosing and surrounding the more specific pressures of the moment”61. 
There are still however dynamic aspects of administrative systems, depicted in boxes L, M and 
N. 
1.3.2.4.1 L: Content of reform packages 
The reform package is the eventual output of the reform process. It is the “the product of the 
interaction between the desirable and the feasible” in elite decision-making62. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert further describe the reform package at the point of announcement as including “a 
considerable rhetorical dimension, playing harmonies on the styles and ideas of the moment. 
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1.3.2.4.2 M: Implementation Process 
Pollitt and Bouckaert identify the implementation process as an important part of the reform 
process. This is chiefly due to the fact that the implementation process can, as influential 
implementation scholars such as Pressman and Wildavsky64 reveal, significantly alter the designs 
of the original reforms. This arises due to the nature of top-down implementation and the fact that 
implementation in this fashion often involves a large number of actors, both governmental and 
otherwise, who become stakeholders in the process and enter it with their own vested interests. 
In addition, it can come to light during the implementation process that intended reforms 
“contradict or detract from other reforms which are being carried through at the same time”65. In 
these ways the implementation process, in combination with the results achieved (Box N), “can 
directly feed back to the elite decision-makers’ ideas” about whether to continue on the particular 
reform path. Results achieved must however be interpreted with a certain level of circumspection 
as “rhetoric and reality can be very hard to disentangle…because [reality] is so thoroughly 
impregnated with the competing discourses through which it is constituted”66.  
1.3.3 Limitations of the model  
As with any model, this model suffers from certain limitations. Many of the limitations below have 
been noted by the authors themselves. It is also likely that given the relative infancy of this model 
in public management literature, further critiques will emerge. 
Reforms can have varying time spans, either as a result of the breadth of the proposed reform 
(comprehensive reforms take longer to effect than those affecting only one agency or department) 
or simply as a result of the intention of the reformer (for example certain governance 
arrangements could be explicitly transitional in nature, a condition which would be commonplace 
in post-conflict contexts for instance). In addition, the period over which forces may act to result 
in change may vary considerably. Whereas a chance event such as a tsunami can cause reforms 
within weeks, a socio-demographic change like an aging population permits reformers, if 
predicted early, a time frame of years, if not decades, to settle on the necessary course of action. 
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These time-frames are important to note because they affect the eventual nature of the reform 
package as reforms which take longer are more susceptible to multi-party influence and thus 
diversion from their initial renderings. Furthermore, the longer the amount of time spent on 
deliberations, the lower the likelihood that reform will ever take place. This is because 
management ideas could become outmoded, citizens could present new pressures or chance 
events could occur and place more urgent demands on state resources. Despite all of these ways 
in which time can affect the reform process, this “temporal aspect of reform” is at best understated 
in the model if not entirely missing67. 
Secondly, the model is based on assumptions which do not all travel well from the studies of 
OECD countries on which they are based. The first assumption, being that of national agency in 
public management reform, is certainly debatable in many countries in the global south in light of 
the influence of the international financial institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the IMF, and the 
conditionalities relating to governance reforms these institutions impose on their funding68. The 
assumption of national agency in reform is debatable even in certain European countries, with 
Greece and the conditions imposed in its various bailout packages being a prime example. Pollitt 
and Bouckaert do note the role of international organisations in producing and transmitting ideas 
for reform69 but they limit these institutions’ roles to that of being mere purveyors of ideas rather 
than making them central to elite decision-making. 
For numerous countries in the global south, especially in relation to the tax administration reforms 
which are the subject of this dissertation, international organisations have certainly not merely 
been the source of new reform ideas. They have in fact been drivers of reform towards a specific 
direction.  The very fact that the SARA model is more prevalent in African and Latin American 
states than in OECD countries is testament to this. Moreover the introduction of tax administration 
reforms has often been made a conditionality of continuing aid in several African states70.  
Furthermore, even in those instances where the reforms were not made on the basis of aid 
conditions, it is my contention in this dissertation (see 3.2.2.2 below) that the tax administration 
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knowledge community is dominated by these organisations. This means that when it comes to 
tax administration reform theirs is the loudest, if not the only, voice and barring some rare and 
influential force, the recommendations of the international organisations will be implemented with 
minor country-specific changes. It therefore does not appear to be accurate to impute absolute 
national agency to many countries in the global south’s public management reforms, especially 
not when the reforms have to do with tax administration. It may also then be inaccurate to contend 
that elites in these countries have “a measure of choice”, at least in any meaningful sense, as 
assumption ii.a. would assert.     
Thirdly, by omitting the role of domestic economic forces, the model overstates the role played by 
global economic forces. While Pollitt and Bouckaert’s induction that global economic forces have 
contributed to public management reforms around the world is fair, by not framing their inclusion 
of economic forces into the model with an emphasis on domestic economic forces, they indicate 
that they either believe that domestic economic forces are always the same as or similar to global 
economic forces or that domestic economic forces do no merit inclusion at all. I find this to be 
inaccurate not only for South Africa during the period under study but surely also in other locales 
around the world as well. While the global economy was experiencing a period of steady economic 
growth led by the upswing of the global financial services industry and robust export-led economic 
growth among south-east Asian countries, South Africa, as discussed further in 3.1.1, had 
recently experienced a period of recession and was at the time operating under relatively flat 
economic performance. With the dire economic situations of many African countries caused by, 
among others, famine, civil wars, and political instability, it would not be inaccurate to characterise 
the 1990s as a period of widely varying national economic performances, something which could 
surely be said of most decades in modern history, the current one included71. It is therefore 
apparent that while there may be broad global economic trends, domestic economic forces seem 
to be more likely to offer an accurate reflection of how economic forces have influenced public 
management reforms in a particular country. This is especially true of countries in the global south 
whose often varied economic growth models make them likely to experience the peaks and 
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troughs of global business cycles differently to industrialised countries, whether more acutely, 
less severely or barely at all. This was observed in the global financial crisis of 2008 which had 
much more deleterious effects on the United States and certain Western European countries than 
it did on many developing countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia72. Thus, it becomes 
that much more crucial for an analysis of economic forces affecting these countries to factor both 
domestic and global economic performance. 
It is for this reason that this dissertation modifies the socio-economic forces aspect of this model 
to include global and domestic economic forces along with socio-demographic changes. This is 
seen in 3.1.1 below.  
1.3.4 Further modification 
This dissertation concerns itself with a rather limited time period, a period which ends with the 
passing of the SARS Bill in 1997. As a result, it does not purport to study how the implementation 
process of the model affected the SARA reforms since the establishment of SARS. As such, 
Boxes M: Implementation process and N: Results achieved, will not feature in the analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the SARA model that will be the subject of this dissertation. It has 
discussed how the model is best marked by its call for an autonomisation of tax administration. 
Whether the model is actually an effective means of improving tax administration performance 
remains largely a matter of conjecture especially in light of some compelling opposing arguments 
and the difficulties of obtaining sufficient conclusive empirical evidence. Whether as a result of 
public management reforms in industrialised countries during the 1990s or the influence of IFIs 
the SARA model does remain popular all over the world, especially in the global south. 
The chapter has also introduced the model of public management reform through which the 
adoption of a SARA in South Africa will be analysed in chapter 3. We have seen that the model 
“embodies interactions between background socio-economic influences, political pressures, 
specific ideas that are in current circulation, and features of the administrative system itself. It 
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identifies both pressures for change and sources of resistance against change”73. At the centre 
of the model is the idea that public sector reforms are the product of intentional elite-decisions 





















                                               





Chapter 2: Tax administration reform: the birth of the South African Revenue 
Services 
This chapter details the structural transformation of tax administration in South Africa which 
resulted in the establishment of the South African Revenue Services. In order to do so, the pre-
SARS configuration of tax administration in South Africa is first detailed. An enumeration of the 
tax administration structural arrangements after the SARS Act was passed then follows and is 
framed by Crandall’s typology of the elements of a SARA. The conclusion to this chapter 
summarises the major elements of tax administration reform in South Africa which will serve as 
the focal points of the remainder of this dissertation. 
2.1 Pre-SARS tax administration structures 
 
Before the transitional institutional reforms which foreshadowed the establishment of SARS, tax 
administration in South African was performed within the Department of Finance. This occurred 
through two branches of the department, each headed by a Commissioner (being a position at 
the level of Deputy Director-General), viz. Inland Revenue and Customs Excise, both accountable 
Figure 2.1. Pre-SARS Tax administration in South Africa 






directly to the Minister of Finance. An organogram of the pre-SARS Department of Finance, 
including the two tax collection branches is depicted in Figure 2.1.  
2.1.1 Branch Inland Revenue 
Inland Revenue was tasked with the collection of all tax revenues under the various tax laws, 
including provincial ordinances, other than any revenues accruing to the State as result of the 
Customs and Excise Act74. Its functions were delegated to five directorates, namely Operations, 
Value Added Tax, Tax Policy Development, Law Administration and Operational Control75.  
The branch’s tax collection function was decentralised to 34 offices of Receivers of Revenue (also 
referred to as “departmental offices”76) littered across the country including in the “homeland” 
states. These Receivers of Revenue were tasked with the registration, assessment and recovery 
of all taxes administered by the branch from taxpayers within their “assessing area” and were 
further responsible for accounting for these taxes to the branch head office77. Receivers of 
Revenue were assisted in their duties by a further 284 “magisterial receivers of revenue” or 
“magisterial offices”, established in the offices of the Departments of Justice or Cooperation and 
Development, in instances where a town did not have its own Receiver of Revenue78. 
2.1.2 Branch Customs and Excise 
Customs and Excise had as its primary function the enforcement of the Customs and Excise Act 
and related regulations as well as providing supplementary services such as the determination of 
the country’s trade statistics79. 
By 1994, a degree of reform within the customs and excise branch had already begun. For 
instance until 1993 the branch comprised five directorates, being Customs, Legal Services and 
Control, Internal Duties, Tariff and Valuation and Functional Services80 whereas by 1994 these 
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had been rationalised into two directorates, namely Customs and Internal Duties, and Auxiliary 
Services.  
The taxpayer-facing function, relating to the collection of duties and the enforcement of other 
aspects of the Customs and Excise Act at borders, took place through 29 district offices, located 
at various points across the country81. 
2.2 The South African Revenue Services 
The South African Revenue Services (SARS) was established through the South African Revenue 
Services Act No. 34 of 1997 (“SARS Act” or “the Act”). In order to facilitate the analysis which 
follows, this section details the institutional form given to this new tax administration body with the 
intention of revealing those parts of its institutional design which distinguish it from its 
predecessors and the rest of South African public administration and are thus the subject of this 
dissertation. Figure 2.2 depicts the early organisational structure of SARS and how this linked to 
the Ministry of Finance. 
Crandall’s “Design considerations for a Revenue Authority”82 are used as the framework through 
which the discussion of these structural aspects will take place. These design considerations are 
based on the proposition that “each Revenue Authority embodies a series of policy choices that 
determines its autonomy, accountability and other characteristics”83. These “other characteristics” 
are the Revenue Authority’s governance framework and its scope of functions. 
2.2.1 Degree of autonomy 
Autonomy in this sense refers to the extent to which a tax administration is operationally and 
otherwise independent from the rest of the public service, especially the finance department or 
equivalent. Whereas tax administrations with high autonomy are able to operate without a high 
degree of executive influence on various aspects of their operations, those with low degrees of 
autonomy are able to have their policy decisions affected through various, often legislatively 
provided, mechanisms, such as the appointment of senior executives, the budget, policy 
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directives and the governing/advisory board. Globally, “Revenue Authorities exist along a 




Crandall sees a SARA’s degree of autonomy as a function of its legal form and status, funding 
mechanism, its degree of budget flexibility, financial policies instituted, control over its human 
resources and its operational autonomy85. The sub-sections below detail the institutional 
arrangements given to SARS. 
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Figure 2.2. SARS’ structure 
Source: Republic of South Africa. South African Revenue Service. Annual Report of the 





2.2.1.1 Legal form and status 
The legal form and status of a SARA determines the extent to which it has legal power to act 
individually and without the constraints of public service laws.  
The Act established SARS as “an organ of state within the public administration, but as an 
institution outside of the public service”86. In so doing, SARS was made immune to the Public 
Service Act and the reaches of the Public Service Commission (PSC), permitting the 
Commissioner much more autonomy in relation to human resources and expenditure in particular. 
On the other hand, its inclusion into the public administration allowed it to be required to adhere 
to s195 of the Constitution87, which details the basic values and principles of public 
administration88. 
In terms of legal authority and powers, the Act allowed SARS to “perform legal acts, or institute 
or defend any legal action in its own name”89, a power constrained by the fact that the Minister 
was given powers to issue a directive which would require Ministerial approval for any or all 
decisions90. Furthermore, the Commissioner was provided with vested power over all revenue 
laws not only through having responsibility on behalf of SARS in administering those laws but 
also by being specifically referenced in various sections of those laws91.  
2.2.1.2 Funding, Budget Flexibility and Financial Policies 
Per the Act, SARS is primarily funded through the combination of the following sources92: 
1. An annual appropriation by Parliament –SARS’ main source of income. 
2. Ad hoc government grants 
3. Fees and charges generated from services rendered to a government department or state 
owned entity. 
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The annual appropriation from Parliament was to be based on SARS’ estimated income and 
expenditure for the following year, as determined by the Commissioner, approved by the Minister 
and reviewed by the Board9394. These estimations were to be tabled in the National Assembly 
(NA) by the Minister95. Any surpluses from use of the appropriation were prohibited from being 
rolled over and were instead to be returned to the National Revenue Fund9697.  
The system above gave the Commissioner discretion in determining the areas to which she 
intended to direct her appropriation and, given the operational autonomy given to her in the Act 
(which is tempered by the accountability and governance mechanisms discussed below), she 
could fluidly readjust the budget across various functions within SARS according to changing 
needs and priorities as determined by her and her executive committee, a fact that was also 
observed in the OECD survey98.  
On the other hand SARS’ financial policies – being regulations over matters such as “accounting, 
asset management and procurement”99 – were placed beyond the control of the Commissioner. 
SARS was required by the Act to adhere to public service-wide accounting and asset 
management regulations and would subsequently be made to comply with the Public Finance 
Management Act100.   
2.2.2.3 Human resources 
As with any organisation, and especially so for a specialised public service organisation such as 
a revenue administration, the success or failure of the body hinges on its ability to recruit sufficient 
and appropriately skilled and motivated staff at all levels. The relationship between the human 
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resource function and autonomy centres primarily on whether the SARA will be required to adhere 
to public service-wide human resource policies or those directed by the Minister.  
By placing SARS outside of the public service and therefore not subject to public service 
regulations, the Act allowed SARS independent control over hiring and firing, setting remuneration 
and setting any other terms and conditions relating to its employees. However, this independence 
was not unfettered. The Act required that SARS’ human resource policies be determined through 
“collective bargaining between SARS and recognised trade unions” and, significantly, “with the 
approval of the Minister”101.  
2.2.2.4 Operational autonomy  
Operational autonomy with regards to a SARA has to do with the extent to which the Minister “has 
day-to-day authority”102. The Minister was not directly given such authority by the Act. The Act 
allowed SARS, through the Commissioner, to “do all that is necessary or expedient to perform its 
functions properly”, specifically including powers such as its human resources function, an ability 
to own assets of any kind, have its own bank accounts and take out insurance over any aspect of 
its activities103.  
Despite this, there were several notable curtailments of SARS’ operational autonomy provided for 
in the Act. Firstly, the Commissioner of SARS was to be appointed by the Minister, with a 
requirement that the Minister merely consult the Advisory Board and Cabinet before making the 
appointment104. Secondly, the Commissioner’s ability to act independently of government and the 
Minister is restrained by a variety of sections in the Act and to various degrees. The most 
prominent one is s4(3) which requires SARS to comply with any policies, directives or guidelines 
issued by the Minister. In addition, section 18(1) does not permit the Commissioner to determine 
“the terms and conditions of employment” of SARS employees without the approval of the 
Minister. Thirdly, it is also apparent that the Commissioner was not given direct power to influence 
tax policy while on the other hand the Minister was empowered to influence tax collection policy 
by virtue of s4(3). Furthermore, the Act provided that the Commissioner only be able to advise 
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the Minister on “matters concerning revenue”, “at the Minister’s request”105, thus empowering the 
Minister to act against the Commissioner’s wishes ever there was conflict.  
2.2.2 Governance Framework 
The choice of the governance framework to be given to a SARA involves deciding on the powers 
and roles to be assigned to the Minister of Finance, the SARA’s governing board – if one is created 
at all – and the Commissioner (or equivalent position)106. The question of the governance 
framework therefore centres on the extent and form in which oversight over the SARA is to unfold 
and the extent to which the Commissioner is going to be given sole or joint control over the SARA. 
The Act established SARS with an Advisory Board, a forum intended to be an “advisory and 
consultative body” for both the Minister and the Commissioner107108. The Board was compelled to 
inform the Minister of any advice it had given to the Commissioner109. The Board was to advise 
the Minister and the Commissioner on all operational matters relating to SARS, including its 
finances, the efficiency and effectiveness of its revenue collection practices, its human resources 
practices, its budget and its relations with trade unions110. To do so it was empowered to conduct 
its own evaluations and investigations into the policies and practices of SARS, require the 
Commissioner to submit to it a report on any matter on which it intended giving counsel as well 
as summon any SARS employee to “give explanations concerning such a matter”111. 
The Act also stipulated the Board’s composition. It was to comprise a maximum of eleven people, 
specifically112: 
 Up to eight people who were “unconnected” from SARS, all of whom were to be 
appointed by the Minister after consulting with Cabinet, 
 The Commissioner; and 
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 Up to two senior employees of SARS appointed by the Commissioner. 
The Act also gave the Minister the power to appoint the chairperson as well as the deputy 
chairperson of the Board, on the condition that the Minister must consult with the members of the 
Board before doing so113. 
SARS’ first Advisory Board had a composition in which 8 of 10 appointees were ministerial 
appointments as the Commissioner had not exercised his right to appoint another executive to 
the board. 
2.2.3 Accountability mechanisms 
With reference to SARAs, accountability mechanisms refer to the channels of reporting required 
of a SARA114. This question concerns itself with the frequency, form and contents of the required 
reporting as well as with the party that is to receive such reports. Accountability mechanism 
decisions also involve considerations of whether and by whom the institution is to be audited and 
to which bodies the results of such an audit are to be submitted115. 
The Act provided for SARS to undergo an annual external audit of its financial records and 
statements by the Auditor-General116. The Commissioner was also required to submit to the 
Minister an annual report on the performance and activities of SARS117. This report had to include 
a summary of SARS’ performance along with its audited financial statements118. The Minister was 
then required to table the report in the National Assembly and submit it to the National Council of 
Provinces119. 
2.2.4 Scope of functions 
The scope of a SARA’s functions is determined by the range of taxes and other state revenues 
administered by the SARA120. 
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SARS’ primary objective according to the Act was “the efficient and effective collection of revenue” 
where revenue was defined as “income derived from taxes, duties, levies, fees, charges, 
additional tax and any other moneys imposed in terms of legislation”121. This duty to collect 
revenues was made with reference to legislation specifically mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Act, 
but essentially included all revenues and taxes in South Africa except for those taxes which may 
only be levied, according to the Constitution, by provincial and local governments. These sources 
of sub-national revenue include gaming licences, liquor licences and property taxes122.  
The taxes administered by SARS include transfer duties, estate duties, all forms of income tax, 
all charges from the Customs and Excise Act, value-added tax (VAT) and marketable securities 
tax. The Act also gave the President the power to amend Schedule 1 by “proclamation in the 
Government Gazette”123 (s33).   
2.3 Concluding remarks 
As apparent from the discussion above, the reforms to tax administration in South Africa were far 
reaching and consequential. The two most comparatively significant aspects of the reforms in tax 
administration, and which will be the subject of much of the remainder of this dissertation are: 
1. Tax administration outside of the public service 
This was definitely the most significant and widely affecting reform to take place during the period 
under consideration. By defining SARS as being outside of the public service, it made the 
Commissioner not beholden to any public service regulations, except for those specifically 
referred to in the Act (such as Public Finance Management Act, which would be included in the 
Act through a 1999 amendment). This was particularly important for activities such as human 
resources and expenditure, where public service regulations were appropriately restrictive in light 
of South Africa’s post-1994 debt, related fiscal stabilisation policies and progressive political 
ambitions.  
By allowing the Commissioner freedom from public service regulations, she was thus permitted 
to remunerate employees at private sector-related rates and embark on any capital acquisition 
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programme she saw fit on the condition, of course, that such actions be carried out with the 
approval, tacitly or explicitly, of the Minister and the Advisory Board.  
2. Quasi-autonomy  
Beyond the more prosaic accountability requirements such as being subject to an annual audit 
by the Auditor-General and submitting an annual report, and despite being given powers by the 
Act to “do all that is necessary or expedient to perform its functions properly”, the Commissioner’s 
powers were constrained by provisions such as s 4(3) and s 18(1) which still empowered the 
Minister with substantial control over SARS.  In addition, the institution of the Advisory Board, 
which was almost entirely comprised of ministerial appointees, afforded the Minister another 
avenue through which to exercise influence over SARS. This was over and above the fact that 
the very appointment of the Commissioner was to be made by the Minister.  
It is an inevitable and warranted consequence of being given greater authority that the 
Commissioner would be subjected to increased accountability and governance requirements 
especially in light of the importance of revenue collection to the state and the power which comes 
from administering tax laws, being among the most pervasive and intrusive in any country124. It is 
therefore unsurprising to find that in all SARAs, the minister of finance has some form of oversight 
over the SARA. It is also unsurprising that the vast majority of SARAs have boards, all of which 
(as of 2010) are more than merely advisory in nature125. However, unlike in most SARAs, in which 
the other accountability and governance requirements are usually reporting and transparency 
requirements which are provided for within existing institutional mechanisms126, such as the 
Auditor-General, ministerial review and parliamentary committee reviews, the combination of the 
legal powers given to the Minister over SARS and the establishment of the Advisory Board made 
the accountability and governance regime over SARS remarkable in comparison to the majority 
of other SARAs. Figure 2.3, prepared by Crandall using the results of a 2006 IMF Survey, 
illustrates this. Taliercio also finds SARS less autonomous than Kenya and Peru but more 
autonomous than Mexico.127 
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The funding mechanism, based on a discretional allocation by Parliament, also served to curb 
SARS’ autonomy. There was certainly an argument to be made, and SARS’ first commissioner, 
Trevor van Heerden, and first CEO Piet Liebenberg, were among the loudest to make it128, that if 
SARS was funded on a proportion-of-revenue-collected basis, this would not only strengthen the 
body’s autonomy but also naturally incentivise the attainment and even the surpassing of revenue 
collection targets set by the Minister. This reasoning partly accounts for why 60% of the SARAs 
surveyed by the OECD have a funding mechanism which is either entirely based on a percentage 
of revenue or includes an option for a percentage of revenue above a specified target129.  
 
 
Thus, although bearing numerous indicators of autonomy such as legal personality, SARS’ 
establishment came with certain legislative provisions which restrained its autonomy in several 
ways. Seemingly, but for the Commissioner’s ability to remunerate employees above public 
service regulations and (limited) powers to orchestrate the internal reconfiguration of the tax 
administration, the post-1997 tax administration regime in South Africa certainly bore distinctive 
resemblances to an intra-departmental service.  
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Chapter 3: Applying the Pollitt-Bouckaert Model 
This Chapter undertakes an application of the Pollitt-Bouckaert model to the reforms which were 
detailed in Chapter 2. These reforms resulted in the establishment of a SARA outside the public 
service with relatively strong mechanisms for executive control over the institution, vested 
primarily in the Minister of Finance. By framing the exposition of the socio-economic milieu in 
1994 according to the typology of forces posited by Pollitt and Bouckaert, this chapter in this way 
performs a direct application of the model. While each of the following sections will not necessarily 
conclude by linking its analysis of the material with a direct link to the Pollitt-Bouckaert model, the 
idea here is merely to the lay the empirical groundwork – in essence, the data– for the chapter 
which follows. Thus, this chapter is deliberately broad and multifocal, intended merely to lay out 
the numerous social, economic and political threads which will subsequently coalesce into the 
structured argument which takes place in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Socio-economic forces 
This sub-section seeks to understand the background socio-economic forces at play at the time 
of tax administration reform in South Africa. The aim is to extract those factors which most 
impacted elites’ notions of desirable and feasible options for addressing the problems in the 
departments of Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue. 
3.1.1 Global and local economic forces 
On the whole, the 1990s were a decade of relatively subdued global economic performance130. 
Although it is difficult and probably unduly ambitious to make sweeping generalisations about the 
state of the global economy at the time, several particularities do stand out, many of which are 
attributable to the growing prevalence of economic policies such as deregulation and liberalisation 
of trade. 
Firstly, deregulation, or in some instances the sheer absence of regulation, over the financial 
services industry was resulting in high levels of activity, volatility and growth131.  Investment banks, 
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merchant banks, large insurance companies, stock brokers and hedge funds were all seeing 
remarkable profits aided in no small part by gains in speculative trading, including the trading of 
derivatives.   
Secondly, the lack of regulation over foreign capital flows in many countries had the positive effect 
of facilitating international trade and investment in these markets but made currencies and 
therefore entire economies more susceptible to the pernicious effects of rapid capital flight, a 
factor which was made even more dangerous by the high volumes of trade which was occurring 
at the time. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated how devastating these effects could 
be. Other countries in the global south such as Mexico and Argentina were also benefiting from 
the globalised and highly liquid financial markets132. 
Thirdly, partly as a result of the global reduction in tariffs brought on by the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), countries with 
competitive advantages in manufacturing experienced remarkable export-led economic growth. 
These countries included Taiwan, China and South Korea. Ironically, this was also an era marked 
by subversive protectionist measures by some industrialised countries and regions. The 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to support European agriculture being an 
example of this.  
Fourthly, numerous African economies such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Congo were 
struggling economically due to civil wars, political instabilities, HIV/AIDS, droughts, poor 
governance and colonial and post-colonial debts, which in some countries was arguably 
exacerbated by the application of austerity policies advocated for by the Bretton Woods 
community.   
In South Africa, due to sanctions, poor economic governance and the civil conflict, the economic 
outlook seemed more of a mirror of the rest of the continent than it did the industrialised West. In 
1994 when the Government of National Unity (GNU)  took office, the extent of national debt and 
a large civil service (combined expenditure on which devoured  92% of the apartheid 
government’s annual budget by the time it left power133), combined with the pressures of satisfying 
a needy and expectant citizenry were proving extremely strenuous on the reaches of the fiscus.  
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GDP growth had been sclerotic, at 0.9% per annum over the period 1982/3 to 1993/4, including 
a period of recession and negative growth rates between 1989 and 1993134. Capital outflows were 
at their highest since 1985’s debt crisis at 5% of GDP. About 40% of economically active South 
Africans were outside the formal economy135 and only 1 in 10 new entrants were being absorbed 
into formal sector employment136. The National Party’s (NP) fiscal irresponsibility resulting from 
their awareness of their imminent departure from government, compounded by poor economic 
performance, had led to the budget deficit rising from 0.9% of GDP in 1989/1990 to 10.8% in 
1993/1994.  
3.1.2 Socio-demographic change 
The young South African government had to contend with a wide variety of socio-demographic 
considerations which, although not necessarily new to the country were, due to apartheid’s 
exclusion of the black majority from material political rights, new to state concern. The most 
pressing of these were: widespread poverty (46% of individuals in absolute poverty in 1995)137; 
high unemployment, especially amongst the youth; exceptionally high inequality (a Gini coefficient 
of 0.68 made South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world); and the need for basic 
services (electricity, basic healthcare, housing, potable water, etc.) from millions in the country.  
3.1.3 Socio economic policies 
The African National Congress (ANC)-led government’s plans to address these issues were 
detailed in the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme138 (RDP), the 
successor to the ANC’s policy document and election manifesto, known as the RDP Base 
Document.139 The RDP sought to address the socio-demographic changes mentioned above 
through the combination of “high and sustainable [economic] growth” and developmental 
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policies140. These developmental policies included undertakings in the categories of “meeting 
basic needs” and “developing our human resources”. Notable policy undertakings included: 
 Providing free basic healthcare 
 Building and rehabilitating schools 
 The electrification of households 
 A primary school feeding scheme 
 Construction of local water infrastructure 
 Restitution of land rights to ease poverty in rural areas 
 A national public works programme to create jobs and improve infrastructure 
 The implementation of affirmative action in the public service 
 A national literacy programme 
 The focus on economic growth would also yield employment opportunities and reduce poverty141. 
3.2 The political system 
Whereas in the Pollitt-Bouckaert model socio-economic factors are treated as merely contextual, 
the political system acts as a catalyst or inhibitor to reform. Thus the question this sub-section will 
set-out to answer is: what was the state of the political system during the tax administration reform 
process under study? Chapter 4 then draws from this sub-section to answer the crucial follow-up 
question: what effect did this have on tax administration reform in South Africa? 
A synthesis of the Pollitt and Bouckaert model reveals that they conceive of the political system 
as being constituted by 1) The macro-political structure of the country (or the sub-national 
structures in the case of local government reforms) and; 2) The political positions of the parties of 
which the elites involved in the decision-making are part. These party-political positions are rooted 
in the characterising ideological perspective of the party, and are influenced by new management 
ideas and pressures from citizens. For this reason, a fair part of this sub-section is devoted to 
discussing the ANC’s defining ideological perspective as well as its views on two issues of 
relevance to this dissertation: the public service and the economy. 
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3.2.1 The macro-political structure 
Between 1994 and 1999 South Africa was governed by the 1993 Constitution (Act No. 200 of 
1993) (“the Interim Constitution”). The Interim Constitution, in giving statutory effect to the sunset 
clauses – a power-sharing agreement emerging from Congress for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) negotiations –  provided for a “government of national unity” (GNU). This provision for 
a GNU meant that until the next set of national elections in 1999 there would be a multi-party 
cabinet based on the parties’ electoral result in the 1994 election. 
After the many guarantees for the protection of minority rights and power-sharing mechanisms 
sought by NP during CODESA negotiations, a purely party proportional representation system 
was still instituted at the level of the national assembly, ostensibly to promote minority party 
representation. In this way, party primacy was entrenched, making it easier for party positions to 
be carried out in parliament due to the party – and its central and most senior leadership – being 
placed in direct control over seats. And in a party such as the ANC where the most senior 
members of the party were placed in government, it made it less politically desirable for members 
to directly challenge – and thus hold to account – the executive142. 
Given their being “ordinary bills” the Interim Constitution made it fairly easy for the amendment of 
public service structures by requiring only a simple majority for such Acts. This is evidenced by 
the fairly long series of Acts passed within the first two years which did precisely that, including: 
the Public Service Act of 1994, the Public Service Laws Amendment Act 47 of 1997, The Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and; the South African Reserve Bank 
Amendment Act 39 of 1997. All of which was possible because of the ANC’s overwhelming 
majority of seats (251 of 400, followed by the NP with 82 seats). 
This overwhelming majority also meant that almost any tax administration reform option was 
potentially feasible for the ANC, including those – and this is quite unlikely in the case of a reform 
related to tax administration – which would require an amendment to the Constitution. Although 
these required a two thirds majority (i.e. 268 votes), it is not unthinkable for the party to have been 
able to whip the seventeen more votes required from among the smaller parties (parties other 
than the ANC, the IFP and the NP) which together occupied 25 seats.  
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After heated debates at CODESA between the ANC on the one side, which favoured a unitary 
state, and the IFP and the NP on the other side advocating federalism and local governance, the 
Interim Constitution created a quasi-federal government, with many crucial political, 
administrative and fiscal powers centralised in national government.  
Among the provisions which gave effect to the decentralisation to local government and provinces 
were those that had to do with fiscal decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation is “the devolution of 
taxing and spending powers”143 to sub-national government. While local governments could raise 
revenues mainly through property taxes and surcharges on services such as electricity144, 
provinces could raise provincial revenues through gambling and lotteries145. Provincial 
governments were also to receive a national transfer, the equitable share, being their share of 
national revenue collections and from which local governments were also to be allocated146.  
3.2.2 New management ideas 
The Commission of Inquiry Into Certain Aspects of the Tax System of South Africa (“Katz 
Commission” or “the Commission”) first interim report147 was an important contribution to party-
political ideas on tax administration. It is for this reason that although it is not a document solely 
or necessarily reflecting the private-sector generated ideas to which Pollitt and Bouckaert refer 
when they speak of new management ideas, I have still included a discussion of its most 
significant findings. I have done so because it had a profound impact on elites’ perceptions of 
what reforms were desirable and so its findings thus provide crucial illumination on the 
provenance of the idea of the SARA model and the extent to which alternatives were considered.  
3.2.2.1 The Katz Commission 
The Katz Commission was officially commissioned by democratic South Africa’s first finance 
minister, Derek Keys, on 22 June 1994.  Chaired by corporate law expert, Professor Michael Katz, 
its terms of reference were wide. The Commission was “to inquire into the appropriateness and 
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efficiency of the present tax system and make recommendations on its improvement taking into 
account internationally accepted tax principles and practices”148. Several aspects of the tax 
system were to receive special attention, including value added tax and the impact of the tax 
system on foreign investment and trade149. The Commission further saw it as important that all of 
its recommendations be “favourable to business and thus encourage new investment”150 and that 
“In addition to the factors which are favourable to the promotion of investment in general…[be] 
designed to promote foreign investment, which must be viewed as an important objective of 
national policy”151. 
The deadline for the first interim report was the ambitious date of 30 November 1994. Despite 
having only five months in which to produce it, the Commission submitted its first interim report 
on 18 November 1994. By then, Keys had resigned and been replaced by former Nedbank CEO 
Chris Liebenberg. Cabinet officially endorsed the recommendations of this report on 8 March 
1995.  
The Katz Commission report and its recommendations were then reviewed and approved by the 
Joint Standing Committee on Finance (JSCF), chaired by the ANC’s Gill Marcus.  The JSCF 
strongly endorsed the findings of the Katz Commission report, in a mere two paragraphs152. 
Other than Katz, the commission comprised six individuals from law, economics or chartered 
accountancy backgrounds: Dennis Davis (commercial law academic), Pierre du Toit (tax lawyer, 
chartered accountant and member of the ANC’s tax policy committee), Dolly Mokgatle (lawyer 
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and businessperson), Philip Mohr (academic economist), Johannes de Villiers Graaf (academic 
economist), and Mfundiso Njeke (chartered accountant and businessperson). 
The Commission’s first interim report presented a woeful picture of the state of the two revenue 
collection departments, Customs and Excise and Revenue collection. It found that: 
1. There had been a high turnover and departure of staff in the years leading up to 1994, 
resulting in there being highly inexperienced staff, staff shortages in skill areas crucial to 
the functioning of a tax administration and a large number of vacancies at management 
level. These capacity constraints resulted in delays in processing returns, rulings and 
claims. 
2. Customs and Excise demonstrated an inability to financially incentivise staff to take on 
positions in crucial, but far flung areas. 
3. Customs and Excise suffered from coordination issues with other government 
departments including the Department of Trade and Industry on whose behalf Customs 
and Excise was administering an export incentive scheme and the Department of Public 
Works which had lagged behind in its plans to construct suitable accommodation and 
facilities at border posts. 
4. The state of the infrastructure (buildings, office equipment, computer technology, etc.) in 
offices of both of the revenue collection branches was deplorable. 
5. Largely as a result of the above, relations with taxpayers were poor thus potentially having 
a detrimental impact on tax morality.  
In carrying out its mandate, the Commission received written and oral submissions from the 
public, including certain “specialist bodies” which the Commission directly requested to make 
early submissions due to the report’s “time constraints”153. Although the Commission does not 
divulge precisely who these specialist bodies were, it is evident from the Commission’s references 
that two of these specialist bodies included the IFIs, the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF was 
cited on numerous issues throughout Chapter 3 of the report, entitled “Tax Administration”: on the 
importance of tax administration to “economies ‘in transition’”154; on tax regimes and their effects 
on foreign capital flows, on labour supply and possible base erosion155; on the state of customs 
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and excise collection in South Africa156; and on the state of VAT administration157.The World Bank 
was referenced on its position on centralised tax administration158. The OECD was also cited in 
Chapter 3: on the importance of the human resource function in tax administration159 
The Commission’s recommendations can be stratified according to those which related to: 1) 
Institutional reform and; 2) Physical and digital Infrastructure. 
3.2.2.1.2 Institutional reform  
This was undoubtedly the area of reform that the Commission saw as the solution for most of the 
departments’ issues. It was the view of the Commission that the deficiencies noted above were 
primarily the result of an inordinately constraining organisational structure – the prevalence of 
“organisational rigidities” as the commission put it160. It asserted that “tax administration in South 
Africa is weakened by an out-dated management structure, ongoing attrition of qualified staff and 
the inflexibility of public sector personnel administration”161. Thus, the Commission advocated for 
“urgent attention to be given to the status and organisational autonomy” of the administration162.   
The Commission further recommended that the reformed structure be modelled on the tax 
administrations of the United Kingdom and New Zealand163.  
3.2.2.1.3 Physical and digital infrastructure 
The Commission’s view was that given the “logistical demands” it foresaw being placed on tax 
administration as a result of the need to widen the tax base, and the increase in trade that would 
result from the lifting of sanctions, it was necessary that the IT capabilities of the departments be 
augmented and modernised164. The Commission argued: “the next decade or two will see millions 
of people, currently marginal to the economy and therefore to the direct tax system, become 
integrated into the modern economy, bringing expanded and more complex demands on public 
                                               
156 Ibid., 28. 
157 Ibid., 33. 
158 Ibid., 39. 
159 Ibid., 52. 
160 Ibid., 23. 
161 Ibid., 31. 
162 Ibid., 263. 
163 Ibid., 53. 





administration, information systems and commerce and trade”165. The Commission also 
advocated for autonomy as a means for the Commissioner of the reformed structure to be able 
to, independently from what it caricatured as sclerotic public service procurement procedures, 
source the physical infrastructure it required. 
3.2.2.1.4 Points of debate in the report 
The Commission was aware that its recommendations would involve materially higher 
expenditure on tax administration. Beyond the once-off investment in infrastructure, freeing the 
Commissioner from public service employment regulations would result in higher staff 
remuneration costs. The necessity of this measure aside, it would certainly add to the pressures 
on Minister Liebenberg and his fiscal affairs team. The Commission’s justification was that higher 
spending on tax administration would in future permit a lowering of tax rates166. Also, this would 
reduce the costs of tax compliance to business and thus permit at least a partial recovery of these 
costs through the resultant increase in revenue collection brought on by economic growth167. The 
Commission also justified these costs by citing those of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
compared to whom, at 0.8% of GDP in the 1993/4 fiscal year, South Africa was underspending 
(New Zealand spent 1.8% of GDP and the United Kingdom, 2.1% of GDP in the comparable 
period)168.  
There were other, possibly less expensive, alternatives to the Commission’s proposals. These 
included retaining tax administration within the department of finance but increasing the authority 
of the Commissioner over human resources by making special dispensations within PSC 
regulations. Yet another option would have been to treat the problems within the two revenue 
collection departments as being the most acute manifestation of issues pervasive to the entire 
public service and therefore attempting to solve these issues at the level of the PSC or 
Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). 
These alternatives were however either explicitly and rapidly eschewed or altogether ignored by 
the Commission. The Katz Commission considered the intra-public service approach and 
discarded it on the grounds that the amendments required to existing PSC regulations, particularly 
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in respect of public service remunerations, would be too significant169. It is also evident that the 
Commission did not believe that any such adaptations of the PSC’s regulations would be 
sufficiently comprehensive, asserting that “the Commission wishes to stress unequivocally, 
however, that the problem is deep-rooted…that ad hoc ameliorative measures cannot be 
expected to reverse the deteriorating situation”170. 
The Commission also argued that the case for an intra-public service solution had been made by 
the previous Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, the 
1988 Margo Commission. The Margo Commission had also expressed concern regarding the 
departments’ struggle to hire adequately skilled and experienced staff171. The Katz Commission 
saw the recommendations made by the Margo Commission – which included augmenting the 
status of the offices of the Commissioners by raising their remuneration and making them directly 
accountable to Parliament – as being neither fully adopted and to the extent that they were 
adopted, unsuccessful.172  According to the Commission this had prompted the Joint Committee 
on Public Accounts, even prior to the establishment of the Katz Commission, to call for an urgent 
investigation into the possibility of forging the departments as independent bodies.173 
3.2.2.2 International sources 
The evidence suggests that international forces had a contribution to the entrance of new tax 
administration ideas into the South African political system. One of the most important ways in 
which this occurred was through the Katz Commission, as mentioned above. The World Bank 
and the IMF as part of an “unusually large research effort”174 had both launched various missions 
on tax administration in South Africa, the recommendations of which were taken into consideration 
by the Katz Commission and, as evidenced by their recurrent mentioning in the report, were found 
to be persuasive. 
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IFIs and aid organisations are hegemonic in the tax administration knowledge community. Even 
a cursory glance at the institutions and funders of the seminal publications and writers on tax 
administration and tax administration reform over the past two decades demonstrates this: De 
Jantscher et al (IMF)175, Crandall176 (IMF), Devas et al (University of Birmingham, funded by the 
DFID)177, Mann178 (a former employee of the World Bank, producing a study funded by USAID) 
and Taliercio179 (World Bank). Although the diversity of researchers appears to be expanding in 
recent times, these organisations had an even firmer stronghold on tax administration research 
during the 1990s.  
This hegemony is unsurprising in view of the fact that tax administration as a field of study has by 
and large been approached from a developmental perspective, these international organisations’ 
ostensible raison d’être, with a view to improving revenue collection outcomes in so called “frail 
states”180. Since these institutions are well-resourced, were arguably pioneers of a multi-
disciplinary engagement with development and were highly involved in plenty of national 
development initiatives from the mid twentieth century, it is a matter of course they have come to 
lead global thought on various development-related issues, including tax administration reform181. 
More cynically, the influence on development research of the Bretton Woods institutions in 
particular is artificially created through their desire to propagate their “neoliberalism” through 
aggressive “loan selling” and related imposition of policy-related conditionalities, often preying on 
already highly indebted countries182. 
3.2.3 Pressure from citizens 
As the Katz Commission revealed, by the end of apartheid, tax administration was in dire straits. 
Many of these issues, because they resulted in delays and errors in the procedural aspects of the 
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tax system such as filings and rulings, were being felt directly by the taxpayer. For example, the 
Commission found that 68% of company assessments were outstanding at the end of February 
1994183.  
The business community in particular was frustrated by these issues and, unsurprisingly, taxpayer 
relations, including with individuals, were poor. The Commission received numerous submissions 
from ordinary citizens who shared their personal frustrations and urged the Commission to 
recommend widespread change. Indeed, the list of submissions to the Commission shows 
numerous private individuals along with the usual suspects: organised business, academics, 
organised labour, and tax practitioners.  
While the more informed sectors of the citizenry might have called for autonomisation, the majority 
of this pressure did not point to any specific reform. Instead, it made it clear to the elites that 
reform, both rapid and substantial, was needed. 
3.2.4 Party-political ideas 
While the creation of the SARS Act involved numerous political parties particularly in the 
parliamentary processes of the two houses of parliament and their respective finance committees, 
the ANC, as the occupant of the clear majority of seats in these fora and being the ruling party, 
undoubtedly led the creation of the Act. It is therefore the ANC’s party-political ideas which are 
most germane to this analysis. 
The ANC was founded in 1912 shortly after the unification of South Africa, through collaboration 
between two groupings of elite Africans: mission-educated professionals and ruling traditional 
leaders. Among its chief aims in those early years was the protection of these elites’ interests in 
the face of an increasingly oppressive and racist, young South African state184. Over the course 
of its century of existence, the ANC has been the political home to various interests and groups, 
at least partly due to a belief in unity within the liberation movement185. Communists, socialists, 
African nationalists, Africanists, traditionalists, organised women and labour, religious bodies, 
multi-racial grassroots movements, have all been welcomed into the fold informally and in some 
cases more formally, such as with the tripartite alliance, the party’s alliance with the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Largely 
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as a result of this the ANC has hardly ever, if at any point, displayed a large measure of ideological 
purity.  
That notwithstanding, one of the ideas which has often appeared in ANC literature has been that 
of the national democratic revolution (NDR). Introduced by the SACP in a 1962 document as a 
bridge between its own socialist ambitions and the ANC’s national liberation priorities, it was 
intended as the first stage of what would be a two stage revolution ultimately leading to a socialist 
state186. It is a matter of serious conjecture – and in all likelihood completely untrue – whether 
modern ANC leaders still see that as being the ultimate goal187. The NDR appears in ANC 
documents and in speeches of ANC intellectuals and leaders as being a revolution aimed at 
achieving a “united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society”188. Presented in 
this rather opaque manner, the NDR is thus susceptible to various interpretations, revisions and 
delays, including confusion or even obfuscation on the SACP’s primary concern, being the “time 
frames and strategic relationships between avowed immediate (national) and ultimate 
(international socialist) objectives”189. However, this opacity has a sizeable political advantage: it 
presents an organisational mission that is potentially wide enough to accommodate, and with 
political dexterity, placate during times of conflict, all members of the broad church of the ANC 
and its alliance partners190.  This opacity does also lead to some internal contradictions: the party 
is at once supportive of internal debate but through its belief in democratic centralism, its list 
system and other internal organisational tendencies also quite undemocratic191; it seeks to portray 
itself as a “grass-roots, mass-mobilised party”192 yet platforms such as the Progressive Business 
Forum suggest a party willingly captured by money politics and the interests of business elites; it 
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styles itself as an adherent of social democracy193 yet its macroeconomic policies have largely 
pivoted further to the right. 
While the NDR serves as the party’s (fairly unstable) ideological mooring, the ANC had, at the 
time of the establishment of SARS, adopted certain positions on more precise topics. Two of 
these topics are relevant to this dissertation: the public service and the state; and the economy. 
In performing this discussion, sub-issues such as privatisation, decentralisation, and race will also 
be touched upon. 
3.2.4.1 The public service and the state 
As conceded by senior government officials interviewed by Cameron and Thornhill194, the ANC – 
and most of the parties involved in the multi-party negotiations leading up to the formation of the 
post-apartheid state – had not devoted as many resources to the question of post-apartheid public 
administration as they had to economic issues or political issues such as coalition governance or 
federalism. This is illustrated by the fact that the only significant public administration-related 
resolution to emerge from the transition-period negotiations was the sunset clause195. 
Thus, when forced to produce something more than an impressionistic vision of post-apartheid 
public administration – during the preparation of the RDP and in the first year of being in 
government – they had to build their vision of public administration largely from the NDR upwards. 
In this regard, the NDR’s tenet of non-racialism was key196.  
3.2.4.1.1 Non-racialism  
While non-racialism is firmly planted into the NDR and the national democratic state (NDS) to 
which it leads, its entrenchment into ANC policy has been far from natural or perfunctory. Its 
establishment now has come about in the same manner in which most policy decisions are made 
in the ANC: through compromise. In this case, compromise resulted from the party’s African 
nationalist and Africanist roots, and its attendant view of the primacy of the cause to liberate 
African people, being tempered by the pragmatic utility of multi-racial organisation during the 
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liberation movement (such as its alliance with the UDF and the formation of the Congress Alliance 
which produced the Freedom Charter), and importantly, the strong non-racial, class-oriented 
perspective of the SACP. Also, the entrenchment of non-racialism was arguably aided and 
legitimised by the Christianity (ideas such as that “all men are created equal before God”197) which 
has been a continual feature of ANC discourse since its creation. The most prominent example 
of the divisive nature of non-racialism within the ANC is the breaking away of a faction of 
Africanists and their formation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. 
Despite non-racialism essentially becoming official ANC policy in 1956 with its adoption of the 
Freedom Charter (which stated that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”198) 
as ANC policy, non-racialism has not been met with robust definitional examination in the party199, 
thus partly accounting for such seemingly clumsy party expressions as: “[the mission of the ANC 
is] the liberation of Africans in particular and blacks in general… [recognising] the central role of 
the working class”200.  
It was this philosophy of non-racialism that the ANC brought into its thinking on public 
administration during the construction of its election manifesto, the RDP, and once it entered 
government in 1994. The philosophy made clear that if a non-racial society was the ultimate goal, 
racial inequities had to be uprooted from public institutions.  
The public administration inherited by the ANC in 1994 was one which carried with it myriad such 
racial inequities. Two of the most discernible were: its quasi-militaristic, centralised nature and its 
racialisation, both in terms of the racialised public service institutions – such as the Bantustan 
authorities and the tricameral parliament – but also its overwhelmingly white, male representation, 
especially at the highest and most influential levels of the public service201. This is illustrated in in 
Table 3.1 below, which presents the racial and gender profile of senior management (defined as 
Director up to Director-General) in the South African public service in 1994. 
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The ANC’s vision of post-apartheid South African public administration was eventually reflected 
in the RDP as well as the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS)202, 
released in November 1995, a forebear of the Public Service Act (PSA).   
This vision included consideration of three important themes: transformation, privatisation and 
decentralisation. 
 
 African Coloured Asian White Male Female 
% of Senior 
Management 
2 1 3 94 95 5 
% of National 
Population 
76 8 3 13 49 51 
 
3.2.4.1.2 Transformation 
From the above two documents, and in light of the prevailing demographics and party-philosophy, 
it is apparent that the reforms which were highest on the ANC’s agenda once coming into power 
related to creating a more demographically representative civil service, eliminating racialised 
administrative structures and building institutions, particularly at subnational levels, which would 
be able to support the provision of quality public services to the millions of South Africans who 
had until then been denied these. 
To this end, the ANC government speedily did away with the Bantustan authorities and the 
tricameral parliament (as was directed in the 1993 constitution) as part of a wider rationalisation 
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and restructuring process, and soon published various white papers, including on affirmative 
action203 and service delivery and training204.  
These initiatives, although very quickly and widely impactful, were modulated by the need to abide 
by the sunset clauses, a power-sharing arrangement implicit in which was a commitment to 
protect the jobs of public servants from the last apartheid government. In light of the sunset 
clauses government policy on the transformation of the public service had to include plans such 
as utilising early retirement packages to incentivise remnants from the previous regime, 
particularly those in senior positions, to vacate their posts. However, this ploy was not always 
successful in achieving rapid transformation205. Michie and Padayachee for instance lamented 
the “excruciatingly slow pace of change”, attributing it to “bureaucratic inefficiencies” and a fear 
by the GNU of alienating employees from the previous public services (national and homeland)206. 
The attempt at rapid transformation of the public service, a process which was riddled with 
difficulties, produced several lessons for ANC elites. These were lessons which the ANC elites in 
all their various state positions are likely to have factored into the manner in which they reformed 
or designed new public institutions, including the tax administration. 
One such lesson was how the relationships between administrative heads of departments and 
their political principals unfolded. While most ministerial positions were held by members of the 
ANC – Agriculture, Finance, Environmental Affairs, Minerals and Energy being among those 
occupied by a member of the National Party – a large number of senior management positions 
were still held by officials from the apartheid era. Admittedly, many of these officials retired 
normally, took early retirement or resigned over the first few years of the Mandela presidency207. 
However, while still in their positions – along with the not insignificant number who held steadfast 
in their positions throughout –  tensions existed between them and their ANC superiors and 
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political principals. This often resulted in role conflict “due to suspicion of public servants from the 
apartheid and homeland administrations [and] a lack of faith in the competence of public servants 
in implementing policy as it was intended”208 . This was exacerbated by many public servants who 
served under apartheid also doubting the competence of their ministers and the newly appointed 
senior public servants mistrusting ministers from the previous regime, all of which was 
undoubtedly fuelled by issues of race and political ideology209. 
3.2.4.1.3 Privatisation 
Privatisation has for many years been a provocative issue in the alliance.  The ANC has not had 
a consistent position on privatisation, with the issue at times exposing the discord which 
sometimes exists between the ANC in government, ostensibly more receptive of the idea, and 
the ANC as a party210. This ambiguity on the matter has its genesis in the 1992 ANC economic 
policy conference in which in an effort to allay the fears of the business community and be 
consistent with his remarks at the 1992 World Economic Forum wherein he had presented the 
ANC as more receptive of market tools, Mandela suggested the inclusion of privatisation as a 
policy option which an ANC government might consider, a suggestion he made as a riposte to 
strong refusals to discard nationalisation by other party members211.In this way, while not ever 
having had any real backing from any quarter within the alliance, privatisation entered the party’s 
policy agenda. Then in the RDP and the RDP White Paper, privatisation was labelled a potentially 
beneficial policy option which would be subjected to “a considered debate…with proper 
consultation with all relevant stakeholders in South Africa through appropriate structures”212. The 
argued benefit would be the generation of funds which could be used for RDP social policies213. 
In 1995, plans for the privatisation of Telkom and South African Airways were announced214 and 
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once GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) was published in 1996, it was clear that 
privatisation, now euphemistically labelled “restructuring”, was now official government policy215. 
Given the still highly contested nature of the privatisation debate within the party in 1995, It is not 
by chance that Mandisi Mpahlwa, ANC member of parliament (MP) and Chairperson of the 
Portfolio Committee on Finance declared, during the NA debate on the SARS Bill: “This is a crucial 
position [that SARS is positioned outside of the public service but within the public administration], 
as it very clearly means that we are not in the process of privatising revenue collection”216. 
3.2.4.1.4 Decentralisation 
Federalism was one of the most controversial topics during the CODESA negotiations. While the 
ANC favoured as unitary a governance structure as it could engineer, the IFP and the NP, which 
were confident of winning Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Western Cape respectively in the first provincial 
elections, were both in favour of a more federalist structure. The IFP leadership was also well 
aware that this was surely “the only constitutional formula which would give regionally based” 
structures like itself any hope of having substantive power217. The ANC was in general wary of 
decentralisation because it feared creating bulwarks of local white opposition which might be 
strong enough to obstruct its transformative political ambitions. 
This contestation resulted in the eventual South African Constitution, in both its interim and final 
forms, settling on what was essentially a compromise. It created a three-sphered form of 
government – local (including Traditional Authorities), provincial and national – in which the 
majority of executive power remained with the national executive, some decentralisation occurred 
to local government while provincial government was afforded fewer powers than the other two 
spheres, thus creating what has often been termed a quasi-federal system218 or an “hourglass” 
                                               
215 Republic of South Africa, Department of Finance, Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A Macro-
economic Strategy (Pretoria: Department of Finance, 1996), 17. 
216 National debates, 
217 Waldmeir, 194. 
218 Maphunye, Kealeboga J. "The features of South Africa’s post-1994 Civil service and the challenges it 
faces in The new dispensation." Morocco, Tangier, African Training and Research Centre in 
Administration for Development (2002), 6; Cameron, R., and C. Thornhill. "Public Service Reform in 






system219. Along with this, there was a bicameral parliament with a separate house of parliament, 
the Senate, to provide for another role for the provinces in legislation.  
3.2.4.2 The economy 
It is valuable to understand ANC economic thinking during the mid-1990s from a historical 
perspective. During its earliest years ANC economic thinking could be described as non-existent 
at worst and unclear at best. It would only be until the entry of communists into the party during 
1920s that it would be forced to commence with a more rigorous examination of its position on 
economic matters, a process which would only see a concrete outcome in future decades. 
Its African nationalist orientation, which as demonstrated in the 1943 African Claims document, 
essentially advocated for an inclusion of Africans into the prevailing capitalist order, demanding 
that Africans be able to freely participate in commerce and trade, was to thus prove malleable to 
the Marxist-Leninist views of the SACP. This would in the 1950s result in a “composite form of 
indigenous radicalism embodied in the vague but often compelling idea of African socialism”220, 
itself a coalescing of ideas made only possible by the SACP’s “abstruse” idea of a “colonialism of 
a special type” (CST) in the 1950s221. Although fairly unclear in its finer points, CST essentially 
allowed for the sublimation of the class struggle into to the national struggle by linking “national 
oppression and class exploitation” in its analysis222.  Coupled with the turn to mass politics, this 
small ideological convergence would form the base of the alliance between the ANC and the 
SACP, an alliance which would continue to impact the ANC’s economic policies in decades to 
come223. 
From this alliance in the 1950s, although not official ANC policy, Marxism would continue to have 
a profound influence on ANC economic thinking until at least the early 1990s. It was part of the 
political education provided to new recruits both in the underground and on Robben Island, thus 
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also increasing its popularity224. It influenced ANC foreign policy, making it gravitate towards 
alliances with communist countries such as the USSR225. And although not every exile was 
necessarily a fervent Marxist, ANC literature, such as Strategy and Tactics (1969) and the “Green 
Book” (1979)226, as well as propaganda (African Communist, Sechaba, Mayibuye and Radio 
Freedom) portrayed a unitedly left-leaning party227. 
The 1950s also saw the publication of the foremost reflection of the ANC’s pre-1990 economic 
position: the Freedom Charter. The Freedom Charter envisioned an interventionist state, calling 
for nationalisation of “mineral wealth, the banks, and monopoly industry”228, a position partly 
inspired by the British government’s nationalisation of numerous industries in the 1950s229, and 
state intervention in business to ensure that it acts in favour of the “well-being of the people”230. 
One of its most famous and debated statements – “The people shall share in the country’s 
wealth”231 – is as much a reflection of a socialist economic agenda as it is of the multi-racial 
Congress Alliance members’ divergent economic, racial and ideological backgrounds. From blue 
collar workers to professionals, from nationalists to socialists, from black miners to white 
academics, the nebulousness of the statement could draw all behind it232.  
Beyond the Charter however, the ANC in exile never clearly expressed the process by which the 
kind of economic change it envisioned would take place beyond the fairly impressionist views in 
the Charter and from Marxism. Padayachee goes as far as to write: “in ANC circles itself little 
attention was paid to economic policy questions until the early 1990s”233. It is not inaccurate to 
state that – apart from notable exceptions such as Thabo Mbeki and Tito Mboweni – the ANC in 
exile was not a highly economically literate cohort, an observation lent further credence by the 
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fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the alliance relied heavily on the trade unionists, 
through ventures such as the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG), to lead economic 
research in the alliance, including being the principle drafters of economic policy documents, such 
as for the ANC’s 1990 Harare conference as well as the RDP234.   
As can be observed from the rhetorical distance between Nelson Mandela’s famous words on 5 
March 1990, that “[t]he nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry is the policy of 
the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable”, and the RDP 
together with the final South African constitution (which enshrined property rights) ANC economic 
thought underwent much change in the early 1990s. 
Numerous reasons have been posited for the ANC’s shift towards economic orthodoxy and fiscal 
conservatism: the fall of the Berlin Wall235, which prompted even the hardened Marxist, Joe Slovo, 
to ask Has Socialism Failed?236 (to which, with qualifications, he essentially answered “Yes”); 
recurrent contact, both formal and casual, by ANC elites with local and foreign business people; 
ANC meetings with Bretton Woods institutions, beginning when a delegation was sent to 
Washington DC in the late 1980s237; the streams of policy advice on South Africa produced by 
these organisations during the early 1990s238; the economic success of China and the Asian 
Tigers239; the influence of the reportedly affable finance minister of the De Klerk government, 
Derek Keys, in advising several ANC leaders including Mandela and Trevor Manuel about the 
sober realities of fiscal governance and the dire fiscal and economic predicament of the country240; 
commitments relating to the 1993 $850 million loan from the IMF241; the merger into the RDP and 
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thus dilution through compromise of the ANC alliance partners’ (SACP and COSATU) economic 
viewpoints.  
Whether it was the work of one of the above forces or their combined influence that did it is 
unclear. What is clear, however, is that the understanding – or the extent to which they were 
factored into policy-making – of global economic power relations by senior ANC leaders did 
change242.  
The ANC’s 1994 election manifesto, the RDP, although still largely progressive, was, much to the 
pleasure of the international community243,  an indication of the beginning of the party’s movement 
towards economic orthodoxy. Its joint aims of poverty alleviation and economic reconstruction 
were to be achieved through economic growth paired with a focus on social development as part 
of a singular development strategy. Broadly, the RDP would achieve its twin aims of growth and 
social development through meeting the basic needs of citizens, upgrading human resources, 
strengthening the economy, democratising the state and society and reorganising the state and 
the public sector.244. Markers of the dreaded and impending “neoliberalism” scorned by 
commentators from the left could be found in its views such as its openness to privatisation, 
partiality to tariff reductions, calls for restraint on government spending and a stressing of the 
necessity of considering capital movements, the foreign exchange market and foreign investment. 
At the same time RDP recognised the role of the state in addressing market failures such as high 
inequalities and facilitating economic growth, spoke of a living wage for workers and suggested 
an inclination towards import substitution and redistribution of 30% of land used for commercial 
agriculture. Consistent with a desire to obtain political buy-in from all quarters of the broad church 
while at the same time pacifying the anxieties of the local and international business communities, 
it was equivocal on both nationalisation and privatisation, describing these as options which under 
the correct circumstances might have their own advantages. These ambiguities also betray its 
nature as a negotiated document largely drafted by policy writers from the trade union movement 
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and then adapted by various members of the alliance, including the ANC leadership245. These 
ambiguities resulted in its meaning “different things to different people” 246 within the Alliance, 
which for the internal political reasons explained above, was to the benefit of the ANC leadership. 
The RDP was superseded by the secretly drafted247 Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) policy document in 1996 as official state and ANC economic policy. GEAR reflected a 
party, or at least an ANC leadership in government, that had embraced the economic orthodoxy 
of the time. GEAR called for a reduction in the budget deficit by cutting public spending (especially 
on civil service salaries) the lowering of taxes on business, a decrease in trade tariffs, a medium-
term expenditure framework, privatisation and investment in infrastructure. These were said to be 
necessary for boosting local investment and attracting foreign direct investment, all of which would 
lead to higher GDP growth and reduce poverty and unemployment. GEAR was met with ire by 
the ANC’s alliance partners, but was maintained in tandem with increased spending on basic 
healthcare, basic education and social grants. 
The public policy process leading up to the enactment of SARS Act began shortly after the 
publication of the RDP White Paper and ended with the passing of the SARS Bill in August 1997, 
a year after the publication of GEAR. Thus the period in which the process unfolded was, like the 
period from 1990 to 1994, marked by the movement of ANC economic policy towards trade 
liberalism and fiscal conservatism.  
Whereas a single explanation for the shift in the thinking of ANC elites between 1990 and 1994 
is not easily or reliably forthcoming, an explanation for the period between 1994 and 1996 might 
be easier to isolate since there was an important change particularly for the ANC’s top economic 
minds (Manuel, Mboweni, Marcus, Mbeki, etc.): they were now actually in government, facing the 
very challenging domestic economic environment painted in 3.1.1 above and confronting the idea 
that the most prosperous countries in the world appeared to be those which had embraced 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy.  
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Chapter 4: Summative analysis 
What the preceding chapter has done is to identify the myriad threads, of varying degrees of 
length and strength, embodying the political-economic forces driving and restraining tax 
administration reform in South Africa during the mid1990s. This chapter’s object is to pull together 
these threads to create a tapestry of the South African political-economy during the period under 
study, insofar as the research has revealed it to be contributory to the establishment of SARS. 
Put differently, and drawing from the Pollitt-Bouckaert model, this chapter answers the questions 
of why a SARA model outside the public service with comparatively close executive control 
occurred as the most desirable and feasible reform option for South Africa. 
From the factors outlined in Chapter 3, the factors posited by this dissertation as being most 
pivotal to SARS’ creation are the following: 
1. The fiscal position of the country (fiscal exigencies) 
2. The absence of competing and compelling models of reform (lack of policy contestation) 
3. Favourable positions and movements within the ruling party and Treasury on economic 
matters. Specifically, on the following economic issues (economic paradigm shifts): 
a. Privatisation 
b. Prioritisation of foreign investment 
c. Opinions on IFIs 
4. Institutional racial demographic transformation as a public service reform priority (public 
service reform priorities) 
4.1 Fiscal exigencies 
Section 3.1.1 demonstrated the immense strain under which the South African fiscus was in the 
immediate post-apartheid period. On the one hand the transitional government had made a 
commitment to the IMF to keep the budget deficit below 6% of GDP and to decrease real public 
sector wages. It had inherited a not insignificant amount of debt, and a budget 92% of which was 
being spent on the combination of servicing this debt and paying the public service wage bill. On 
the other hand there were numerous legitimate popular and political demands for much higher 
public spending on basic services, health, education and the other socio-economic policies 
mentioned in 3.1.3. It thus became clear that public expenditure was not going to substantially 
decrease and attention had to be paid to improving the revenue side of the fiscal equation, a feat 





and by all accounts the already sluggish economy was not likely to react well to tax increases. 
Instead, an aggressive effort to improve revenue collection was needed.  
Thus, in spite of there being intra-public service options which might have resulted in 
improvements, these options were not perceived to be desirable as they necessitated a more 
gradualist approach to reform, demanding time that the government reasonably could not have 
believed itself to have considering the pressing economic and political concerns mentioned 
above. Moreover, the SARA option, being a dramatic but possibly rapidly implementable shift 
from the status quo was made more desirable by the fact that the experiences of other developing 
countries before it and the possibility to consult with the international aid community, made speedy 
reform technically feasible. In light of the importance of revenue collection for achieving any 
political objectives, and the fact that the current state of revenue collection was deplorable and 
merited speedy resolution was accepted by all quarters (see 3.2.3 above on pressure from 
citizens), the SARA option became politically feasible as well.  
4.2 Lack of policy contestation 
While numerous issues in the early post-apartheid period were the subject of much policy 
contestation on ideological and pragmatic grounds (such as affirmative action policies, the new 
constitution, and the extent of social spending), the autonomisation of the revenue service was, 
disagreements in 3.2.4.4 included, a virtually unanimously supported solution by the political 
parties.  
From the data outlined in Chapter 3, it is my contention that this lack of contestation was aided 
by there being an absence of any other option being put forward or debated. The Katz 
Commission, through its spirited advocacy of New Zealand or United Kingdom-type reforms and 
rapid dismissals of alternatives to these, essentially evoked the Thatcherite maxim, TINA, “There 
Is No Alternative”. The tax administration reform literature, dominated by the IFIs as discussed 
above, practically spoke of nothing but the SARA model. Thus, when the fiscal exigencies referred 
to above meant that the manifestly deleterious state of affairs in the two tax departments had to 
be urgently addressed, the SARA model was inevitably given utmost preference. The success of 
the SARA model was assisted further by the niche nature of tax administration, which meant that 





My analysis of a dearth of tax administration expertise is similar to the one provided by others on 
economic policymaking in the early to mid-1990s. Padayachee248 for instance argues that relative 
economic illiteracy was one of the factors which contributed to the ANC’s economic policy shift 
towards economic orthodoxy. He contends that because there was an absence of a “tradition of 
substantive economic policy debate within the ANC” they suffered against the “furious assault” on 
their economic positions taking place on several fronts. This, combined with the “incoherence and 
unclarity” of these positions, a feature exacerbated by regular conflict between alliance leadership 
and academic economists working with them such as those in MERG, meant that that they were 
unlikely to be able to avoid persuasion by the foreign business schools, think tanks, and 
investment banks which many of them attended in 1992-93 for short executive training 
programmes.  
In the same way that the ANC’s weakly constructed, internally conflicting economic policies had 
made these policies vulnerable to international influence, so too did the alliance and the 
government’s shortage of tax administration expertise essentially render them at the mercy of the 
intellectual largesse of the international financial and aid community.  
4.3 Economic paradigm shifts 
The evidence detailed in 3.2.4 above revealed economic positions – or at the very least, shifts in 
positions – by groups of key elites in the ANC and in government which, taken together, suggest 
a policy environment favourable to the implementation of the SARA model as a reform option. 
Firstly, the ANC’s official ambivalence to privatisation in the face of a Treasury much more willing 
to utilise it, created the space for the political manoeuvering required to implement an option as 
suggestive of agentification and privatisation as the SARA model is.  
Secondly, the publication of GEAR made clear what even the terms of reference of the Katz 
Commission had referenced, that it was the view of Department of Finance that the post-apartheid 
economic strategy which was most likely to address the country’s socio-demographic issues 
needed to include an effort to attract foreign direct investment, a task which intrinsically 
necessitates the emittance of signals more favourable to attracting international business. Thus, 
the SARA model, the vogue of international tax administration and increasingly a feature of 
Western governance, would certainly have been beneficial to the campaign to present South 
                                               





Africa as a sound investment destination and to prevent capital flight. As Waldmeir249 notes, this 
tradition of courting international favour has roots in the ANC’s strategy against the apartheid 
government and would thus not have been completely alien to senior party leaders. 
The fact that the model has strong roots in policy advice from the IFIs might, given the scepticism 
to these organisations prevalent in various corners of the tripartite alliance250, have proceeded to 
receive political obstruction both from the Ministry of Finance and the ANC caucus in parliament. 
Even the RDP presented a party wary of the IFIs, stating “[r]elationships with international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund must be conducted 
in such a way as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the interests 
of the South African population and the economy”251. 
In light of this cynicism, key elites might not have perceived the SARA option as a desirable option. 
However, in view of the increasing embrace of economic orthodoxy and its related prioritisation 
of foreign direct investment occurring within Treasury and certain influential quarters of the ANC, 
it became possible for the policy advice from the IFIs to be better received or to at least be 
relatively denuded of its potential affront.  
4.4 Public service reform priorities 
Highest on the ANC’s public sector reform agenda was the project to transform the demographics 
from their historically white and male patterns. Crucial to the success of this project was the need 
to have sufficient power to realise this ambition in light of likely impediments to the reform project’s 
path. Fortunately for this endeavour, the Interim Constitution had created a purely proportional 
representative system and had centralised numerous powers in national government and the 
national houses of parliament, thus decreasing the chance for uneven application of the ANC’s 
reforms across the country. 
It was also a project the ambit of which would reach across the breadth of state institutions. 
Although several initiatives had been undertaken during the transition to a SARA, it was 
necessary for the executive to have sufficient political influence over the now semi-autonomous 
body to ensure adequate completion of the project.  
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There are several other examples of the fortification or augmentation of executive powers for the 
purpose of institutional transformation among the public service reforms of the era. A reform of 
this nature can be found in the combined reformative effect of the 1996 Constitution and the Public 
Service Laws Amendment Act252. These resulted in executive control of the human resource 
function of the public service being shifted from the PSC, where it had been placed by the interim 
constitution, to the minister of Public Service and Administration. Cameron similarly 
contextualises an amendment to the PSA in 1998 which decentralised human resource functions 
to provincial governments. The amendment did not decentralise these powers to the 
administrative heads of the departments but instead to the members of the provincial executive 
councils (MECs) overseeing these departments. He writes253: “the new ANC government did not 
trust white bureaucrats of the old order, who were still present at the higher levels of public 
administration in disproportionately high numbers. Politicians with executive powers were needed 
to transform the higher echelons of the bureaucracy.”    
It is thus apparent that the combination of the sunset clauses and the young government’s 
experience in governing in the early post-apartheid years justifiably made the ANC reluctant to 
afford inordinate powers to senior administrators such as the Commissioner of SARS. Thus, seen 
with the aforementioned intentions and reforms in mind, the Minister of Finance being provided 
with the kind of powers detailed in Chapter 2 and consequently reducing the autonomy of the 
Commissioner in favour of higher direct executive influence, is consistent. Given that the first 
commissioner of SARS was slated to be Trevor van Heerden, a relic of the apartheid era 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Characteristic of the tendency observed by Pollitt and Bouckaert to intertwine rhetoric with reality 
when presenting the final “reform package”, the introduction of SARS was not without its share of 
flamboyant descriptions by government elites. Introducing the SARS Bill in parliament, Trevor 
Manuel evoked unfortunate Maoist imagery by describing the Bill as a “great leap forward”254 while 
in 1998, then Commissioner, Pravin Gordhan, remarked: “the activities and the changing 
character of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) in the year under review are best 
captured by the image of a caterpillar changing into an elegant butterfly”255. 
SARS’ record since inception does appear to vindicate this exuberance. SARS has consistently 
met – and often far exceeded – revenue collection targets. Under its administration, tax revenues 
have grown from 22.6% of GDP in 1994/95 to 25.7% of GDP in 2014/15, reaching a peak of 
27.1% in 2007/08256. At the same time, the number of registered taxpayers has risen dramatically. 
Registered companies, for instance, have grown from 0.81 million in 2002/03 to 2.9 million in 
2014/15. All of this has been done with widely acclaimed efficiency and strong taxpayer relations. 
Whether autonomisation was the primary causal factor for these revenue collection feats is 
debatable. Friedman257 for instance argues that an important reason for SARS’ tax collection 
success has been a pre-existing culture of rule compliance in South Africa and a resultantly high 
tax morality. According to the kind of classical understanding of the relationship between 
autonomy and revenue authority performance discussed in Chapter 1, one would expect that 
SARS’ performance would have suffered demonstrable setbacks as a result of autonomy 
deficiencies. Of course other beneficial factors such as the stability of the autonomy, the widening 
of the tax base, improved processing and investigation, a growing economy and a high tax 
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morality could have overcome the constraints purportedly imposed by lower autonomy. However, 
a plausible conclusion is offered by Smith258: that there existed a “supportive political environment” 
and that the “close working relationship” between Treasury and SARS was actually conducive to 
SARS’ performance as, among other benefits, the relationship facilitated SARS’ playing a larger 
role in the formation of tax policy. 
It is thus quite apparent that the tax administration canon is far from conclusive on whether there 
exists a direct relationship between autonomy and authority performance. Fortunately for this 
researcher, the research burden of this dissertation did not include this onerous task. Instead this 
dissertation sought to answer the following research questions:  
1. Which political-economic forces led to the establishment of SARS? And; 
2. With respect to the structural idiosyncrasies which define SARS: 
a. Which of these elements most significantly distinguish SARS from the rest of the 
South African civil service and from other SARAs? and; 
b. In what way were these elements shaped by the forces in 1? 
As a heuristic device to ease what would otherwise be an almost prohibitively complex task, a 
modified form of the Pollitt-Bouckaert Model of public management reform was utilised. This 
model, arguably the most seminal model of its kind in the literature at the moment, was unpacked 
and critically examined in Chapter 1. It is a model which views public management reforms as 
emerging from deliberate elite calculations of desirability and feasibility, calculations which are 
shaped by socio-economic forces and the prevailing national political-administrative system. 
Given its underappreciation of the influence of domestic economic forces, the model was 
modulated to include these in its conception of socio-economic forces. In light of the specific 
temporal concern of this dissertation, the model was further modulated to exclude the iterative 
influence of the implementation process and the results achieved therefrom. Also included in 
Chapter 1 was an introduction and critique of the SARA model, the tax administration model 
embodied in the creation of SARS. This revealed revealing the SARA model’s widely applied yet 
theoretically and empirically contested nature. 
From this conceptual foundation, the research questions could then be answered. Using a wide 
variety of publicly available primary and secondary data sources, primarily documental in nature, 
                                               
258 Laila Smith. “The Power of Politics: The Performance of the South African Revenue Service and Some 





Chapters 2 to 4 proceeded to provide such answers. Chapter 2 demonstrated that SARS was 
markedly different to its preceding institutions primarily because it was established outside of the 
public service, thus providing unprecedented (in the South African context) powers to the 
Commissioner. However, the autonomy which these powers were ostensibly intended to provide 
was modulated by legislative provisions providing for influence over the SARA by the Minister of 
Finance. In this way, SARS was comparatively under more executive control and thus less 
autonomous. 
Chapter 3 then mapped the political-economic landscape insofar as it was relevant to the 
contemplated research questions. This map facilitated Chapter 4’s inductive analysis of why a 
semi-autonomous body was instituted and how its comparatively higher degree of executive 
control came to be legislated. The evidence examined produced four principal factors which when 
taken together provide answers to these research questions. Firstly, it was found that pressures 
from citizens for progressive and redistributive economic policies, a grim inherited economic 
position and a large, expectant poor and unemployed population created high fiscal exigencies 
which demanded a rapid amelioration of the deleterious state of the tax administration. Secondly, 
the relatively radical, seemingly rapidly implementable SARA option was aided by a set of 
circumstances which made the SARA model relatively uncontested as the appropriate policy 
choice: the model was the sole and primary model being advocated by the tax administration 
literature, produced largely by the international aid community; domestic familiarity with tax 
administration reforms was low; and the Katz Commission was assertive in its promotion of the 
model. Thirdly, elites were made further receptive to the model – or at the very least, less likely 
to be able to mount a strong unified objection to it – as a result of party-political ideas on 
privatisation and international investor relations which were ambiguous and on a neoliberal 
trajectory. To the extent that concerns about privatisation existed, these were tempered by the 
provision of strong executive powers to the Minister of Finance. The inclusion of such executive 
powers was also found to have reasonably been influenced by the fourth factor in this analysis: 
the need to fulfil the primary public service reform priority of the era i.e. deracialisation. In order 
to change the demographics of the public service in the country at the time, lessons from these 
kinds of reforms in the broader public administration, such as sluggish transformation and the 
emergence of conflict, made creating executive power a priority in this particular reform. 
This dissertation constituted – as far as this researcher could tell – the first published application 





reform. This application, while methodologically limited as discussed below, does provide certain 
insights on the application of the model and its heuristic value. One in particular merits discussion 
here. While this model, and other such models which seek to account for or at least frame what 
are dynamic and complicated processes, is incredibly useful in focusing and thus easing a 
research project, it should never be applied blindly. For instance, one of the central findings of 
this dissertation – the role of fiscal exigencies in driving desirability calculi towards the SARA 
model – might not have been uncovered had there not been a critical examination of the model 
revealing its undervaluing of domestic economic forces. It was an investigation into such forces 
which revealed the pressing fiscal pressures and unpromising economic outlook of the era. And 
it was this investigation which then allowed for a more complete representation of the socio-
economic forces driving the SARA reform in South Africa. 
It is also, with the same qualification as above, the first academic investigation into the creation 
of the South African Revenue Service. It demonstrated that beyond the prosaic answer for the 
need to rescue a malfunctioning inherited revenue service, there existed a complex of mutually 
supporting forces – with hitherto unexplored links to sub-areas of analysis on South Africa’s 
transitional period – which account for the application of the SARA model in South Africa. It thus 
affirmed how paradoxical such a facile answer would have been for a period of such 
unprecedented complexity and institutional reform for the country. Its method and findings should 
hopefully prove useful to future researchers, particularly in its eclectic approach which blends 
themes in politics, public administration, development and economics to reach conclusions about 
the nature of the South African polity. 
As this dissertation constituted a desktop analysis of publicly available data, there is scope for 
further research within these same research questions, especially through field-oriented research 
methods such as interviews with figures involved in inter alia the parliamentary finance 
committees, National Treasury, the Ministry of Finance, the ANC and the IFIs’ missions to South 
Africa during the period under study. If our ambitions are to understand public management 
reforms around the world, this dissertation’s modifications to the Pollitt-Bouckaert model prove 
that further lessons could be learnt through more application of the model in diverse localities and 
types of public administration. In this way, this dissertation will hopefully be but a modest early 
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